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Abstract 
 
For several years, courts have been improperly calculating damages in 
cases involving the unlicensed use of genetically-modified (GM) seed 
technology.  In particular, when courts determine patent damages based on 
the hypothetical negotiation method, they err in exaggerating these 
damages to a point where no rational negotiator would agree.  In response, 
we propose a limited affirmative defense of an implied license due to the 
patent’s status as a de facto standard essential patent.  To be classified as a 
de facto standard essential patent, the farmer must prove three elements 
that reflect the peculiarities of GM seeds used in farming: (1) dominance, 
(2) impracticability, and (3) necessary to fulfill a basic need.  Based on the 
approaches used by courts and standard setting organizations in licensing 
standard essential patents in technological fields such as cell phones and 
software, designation of some GM seeds as standard essential patents 
allows the courts to imply a license from patentees to farmers on 
reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms.  Doing so shifts the case 
from a tort-based patent infringement suit to a breach of contract dispute 
and alters the damages regime from one based in compensation, 
deterrence, and punishment (a tort approach) to one based solely in 
compensation (a contractual approach).  As a result of this novel proposal, 
the damages calculations in these suits return to economic reality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Kem L. Ralph owned a farm in western Tennessee growing cotton, 
soybeans and corn.
1
  In preparation for the 1998 planting season, he 
“purchased 264 fifty-pound bags of soybean seed containing [Monsanto’s] 
Roundup-Ready biotechnology.”2  “Roundup-Ready” is shorthand for the 
fact that the seed is genetically modified (GM) to be resistant to Roundup 
                                                          
1
 Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004).   
2
 Id. 
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herbicide.
3
  When roundup is sprayed on crops, weeds are killed, but the 
GM plant survives.
4
 
Monsanto
5
 patented the genetic modifications necessary to the 
production of “Roundup-Ready” seed.6  More precisely, it patented 
“recombinant gene sequences that can be inserted into plant seeds to protect 
them against the effects of glyphosate-based herbicides.”7  When a farmer 
purchases and plants the “Roundup-Ready” seed, he is making use of the 
patent.
8
  As such, each time the farmer purchases a bag he pays a 
“Technology Fee” for a license that costs approximately $5 per bag.9  But 
the license is narrow; it allows the farmer to use that particular bag of seed 
for one season only.
10
   
However, the limited nature of the license contravenes an important 
facet of nature, that seed begets seed.  A soybean plant with ten pods can 
produce twenty-five seeds.
11
  This has implications for farming tradition 
and practice.
12
  Farmers harvest most of their crop to feed the public, but 
from a portion of their crop, farmers harvest seed for use during the next 
growing season.
13
  Ralph was no different.
14
  Ralph recovered 796 bags of 
seed from the 1998 growing harvest for use in the 1999 growing season and 
recovered 438 bags of seed from the 1999 growing harvest for use in the 
2000 growing season.
15
  
                                                          
3
 Id. 
4
 Id. 
5
 Throughout this Article, references to Monsanto represent the firm as a patent holder of 
GM seed strains.  Other firms holding similar patent rights for GM seed strains or traits 
include BASF, Bayer CropScience, Dow Chemical, DuPont, Pioneer Hi-Bred, and 
Syngenta, among others.  William Neuman, Rapid Rise in Seed Prices Draws U.S. 
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2010, at B1.  
6
 Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1377. 
7
 Id. 
8
 Id. 
9
 Id. 
10
 Id. 
11
 Each pod contains two to three seeds.  CHAD LEE & JIM HERBEK, ESTIMATING SOYBEAN 
YIELD 2 (University of Kentucky – College of Agriculture 2005), 
http://www.ca.uky.edu/agc/pubs/agr/agr188/agr188.pdf. 
12
 Rick Weiss, Seeds of Discord; Monsanto’s Gene Police Raise Alarm On Farmers’ 
Rights, Rural Tradition, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1999, at A01 (describing farmers who follow 
the tradition of harvesting and replanting seeds as “seed savers”). 
13
 Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting Around Statutory 
Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV.93, 95-96 (2006) (discussing 
the “time-honored practice” of saving seed). 
14
 Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1377. 
15
 Id. at 1377-78. 
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Monsanto sued Ralph, asserting that Ralph’s license was for one 
season only – 1998 – and claiming that planting in 1999 and 2000 infringed 
its patent.
16
  The issue in the case was not whether Ralph had violated 
Monsanto’s patent.17  It was clear that he had.18  The issue was how to 
measure damages.
19
  Ralph insisted that he should pay the established 
royalty for use of the seed.
20
  He argued that the “standard Technology Fee 
that Monsanto charges all farmers is ‘the most established royalty patent 
infringement litigation has ever seen”21 and that the court should take the 
total number of bags of seed he recovered over the two years and multiply 
that by the per bag technology fee, i.e., (696+438) * $5/bag = $6,170.
22
  The 
court rejected Ralph’s argument, finding that the use he made of the patent 
was broader than what the Technology Fee would cover.
23
  Again, the 
license was very narrow, limiting use of the GM seed to producing one 
year’s crop; Ralph was using the GM seed to produce one year’s crop and 
seed for the next year. 
The court also seemed concerned that simply awarding the 
Technology Fee would not result in adequate deterrence; if it awarded only 
$6,170 in damages future farmers would have no incentive to follow the 
law.
24
  Future farmers could infringe the patent and pay the royalty fee only 
if they got caught.
25
  Such reasoning ignores the fact that the court could 
have found that the reasonable royalty was $6,170 and trebled it to 
$18,510.
26
  Nor does it consider the time and money required to defend such 
a suit. 
                                                          
16
 Id. at 1383. 
17
 Id. 
18
 In fact, the district court struck Ralph’s answer, affirmative defenses and counterclaims 
when he admitted to destroying evidence, specifically, using tires and diesel fuel to burn 
900 bags of seed in a bonfire that lasted two days.  Peter Shinkle, Fighting From The 
Ground Up; Monsanto Reaps Some Anger With Hard Line On Reusing Seed, GRAND 
FORKS HERALD, May 20, 2003, at D1. 
19
 Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1383. 
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. 
22
 Id. at 1379. 
23
 Id. 
24
 Id. at 1380. 
25
 Brian Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent Infringement 
Deterrent, 74 MO. L. REV. 909, 920 (2009) (quoting Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 
1098, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
26
 35 U.S.C. § 284 (“ the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount 
found or assessed.”).  In Monsanto Co. v. Roeder, the court suggested this logical approach, 
but Monsanto argued that such a limitation would not be proper and the court relented.  
Monsanto Co. v. Roeder (In re Roeder), 2009 WL 4907014, *11 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Dec. 
14, 2009). 
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Which party holds the moral high ground in the battle between 
Monsanto and farmer is a matter of perspective.  Monsanto claims that 
“between 1997 and April 2010 [it] filed just 144 lawsuits to enforce [its] 
patent rights against farmers,”27 and only as a last resort, when necessary to 
“secure investment and innovation.”28  Monsanto’s detractors point out that 
those lawsuits that have been filed – together with the 700 investigations 
conducted by Monsanto – intimidate farmers and force them to raise crops 
other than those where GM seed contamination is a possibility.
29
  In fact, 
Kem Ralph, whose story is told above, was forced to declare bankruptcy in 
2007 following his battle with Monsanto.
30
  The Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
filing – which allows a company to reorganize and continue – was a last 
ditch attempt to save his farm.
31
  As to the filing, Ralph stated, “I’m a 
farmer, . . . they may take [my farm] away from me, but they’re going to 
have to fight me first.  All I want is justice to be served.”32   
When one considers that farmers are being put out of business 
simply because they carry on a centuries-old tradition of saving seeds, it 
makes sense that some commentators characterize Monsanto’s litigation 
strategy as overzealous.   As one commentator points out: 
 
Monsanto has been very aggressive in enforcing these 
restrictions, especially the restriction on farmers saving seed.  
As of October 26, 2007, Monsanto had filed 112 lawsuits 
against farmers for alleged violations of its Technology 
Agreement and/or its patents on genetically engineered seed.  
In addition to the over 100 lawsuits that have actually been 
filed, there are many more suits that have ended in private 
out-of-court settlements.  The inability of farmers to save 
                                                          
27
 Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544, 549 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
28
 Repps Hudson, Illinois Farmers Want To Be Able To Keep Some Patented Seeds, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 7, 2005, at B1. 
29
 Brief of Amici Curiae Farm and Ranch Freedom Alliance et al. in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants in Support of Reversal at 12, Organic Seed Growers and Trade Ass’n v. 
Monsanto Co., No. 2012-1298 (Fed. Cir. July 11, 2012); Michelle Ma, Comment, 
Anticipating and Reducing the Unfairness of Monsanto’s Inadvertent Infringement 
Lawsuits: A Proposal to Import Copyright Law’s Notice-and-Takedown Regime into the 
Seed Patent Context, 100 CAL. L. REV. 691, 693 (2012) (describing Monsanto’s 
“propensity to heavily guard its intellectual property.”). 
30
 Andy Meek, Down and Out in Covington, THE DAILY NEWS, June 22, 2006,  
http://www.memphisdailynews.com/news/2006/jun/22/down-and-out-in-covington. 
31
 Id. 
32
 Id. 
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Roundup Ready seed has turned the agricultural world on its 
head.
33
    
 
The issue further comes into focus when one considers the damages 
awarded.  In Ralph, the damages for infringing the soybean patent were 
$66,639 and subsequently trebled to $199,918.
34
   All damages entered 
against Ralph totaled $2,937,527.07.
35
  Farmers like Kem Ralph are unique 
in their societal role as providers because they are fulfilling basic needs for 
little monetary reward.  As such, when they follow the time-honored 
tradition of saving seed, they should not face damages totaling thirty times 
their yearly net profits.
36
   
To remedy the problem of inflated damage awards against farmers 
using GM seed, we propose that patents governing GM seeds should be 
deemed de facto standard essential patents (de facto SEP), when certain 
requirements are met.  Specifically, these requirements are that: (1) the 
patent holder has achieved dominance in a given field; (2) it is 
impracticable to expect that a farmer could operate without infringing the 
patent; and (3) the farmer is growing a crop used to meet a basic human 
need.
37
   
Once the GM seed has been labeled a de facto SEP, courts can find 
an implied license between Monsanto and farmers.
38
  Authority for 
implying a license can be found by analogizing from the hardware and 
software industries where standard essential patents are common and 
standard setting organizations (SSOs) are frequently used to mandate 
licenses on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms.
39
  As a result 
of an implied license, courts can transform patent infringement, a tort, into a 
contract dispute.
40
  This changes the damages regime from one based in 
compensation, deterrence, and punishment to one based in compensation 
only.
41
   
The approach we propose has the advantage of recognizing that 
Monsanto has a right to protect its patents and that its patents can be a force 
                                                          
33
 Tempe Smith, Note, Going to Seed, 61 ALA. L. REV. 629, 630 (2010). 
34
 Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
35
 Id. 
36
 See calculations infra Part II.B. 
37
 See infra Part III.B. 
38
 See infra Part III.C.1. 
39
 See infra Part III.C.1. 
40
 See infra Part III.C.2. 
41
 See infra Part III.C.2. 
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for good.  GM seed can increase production.
42
  Some even see GM 
organisms as a solution to world hunger.
43
  To that end, “Monsanto has 
produced a GM rice, ‘golden rice,’ which contains high levels of beta 
carotene to prevent vitamin A deficiency-related health problems.”44  By 
attempting to strike a balance, this Article moves beyond the existing 
literature, which tends to take an absolutist approach, e.g., Monsanto should 
not have the ability to patent genetic sequences
45
 or infringement should 
have an intent element.
46
   
Part I of this Article explains Monsanto’s GM seed patents and 
describes the types of farmers using these seeds and the activities they 
engage in that constitute patent infringement.  Part II explains the methods 
of calculating damages and describes how infringing farmers have been 
routinely enjoined from further use of GM seed and subjected to tort 
damages, which have been inflated for deterrent or punitive impact.  Part III 
argues that a more appropriate model exists for reconciling the competing 
interests of Monsanto and farmers.  Where patented technology necessary 
for the provision of a human need reaches de facto SEP status, a license 
should be implied between the patent holder and those users who cannot 
practicably fulfill such human need without infringing the patent.  Such a 
license should be based on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) 
terms.  However, Part III also argues that this departure from the traditional 
operation of patent law be limited to cases where the farmer is not 
competing with the patentee by knowingly selling GM crops or seed for 
others to replant.  Finally, Part IV analogizes our proposal to the Plant 
                                                          
42
 Each plant is more productive and the space between rows (necessary for weeding) can 
be reduced.  David J. Schnier, Genetically Modified Organisms & The Cartagena Protocol, 
12 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 377, 385-86 (2001). 
43
 Erik Benny, “Natural” Modifications: The FDA’s Need to Promulgate an Official 
Definition of “Natural” that Includes Genetically Modified Organisms, 80 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1504, 1520 (2012). 
44
 Zachary Lerner, Rethinking What Agriculture Could Use: A Proposed Heightened Utility 
Standard for Genetically Modified Food Patents, 55 KAN. L. REV. 991, 999 (2007). 
45
See e.g., Kojo Yelpaala, Owning the Secret of Life: Biotechnology and Property Rights 
Revisited, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 111, 114 (2000) (questioning whether biotechnology 
should be patentable); Lara E. Ewens, Seed Wars: Biotechnology, Intellectual Property and 
the Quest for High Yield Seeds, 23 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 285, 287 (2000) (arguing 
for the diminishment “of intellectual property protection for plants by lowering the number 
of years patents extend protection”).   
46
 See e.g., Kathleen C. Rose, Comment, Protecting The Farmers: Limiting Liability For 
Innocent Infringement Of Plant Patents, 12 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 117 
(2011) (proposing a defense for innocent infringement); Brennan Delaney, Note, What 
Happens When the Gene Gets Out of the Bottle?: The Necessity of an Intent Element for 
Infringement of Patents Claiming Genetically Modified Organisms, 76 UMKC L. REV. 553 
(2007) (proposing an intent element for patent infringement). 
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Variety Protection Act to illustrate how the implied license scheme we 
propose has some support under existing law. 
Currently Bowman v. Monsanto Co. is pending before the Supreme 
Court.
47
  This case deals with patented GM seeds and the legal liability of 
reusing the seeds.
48
  However, the ultimate decision in Bowman will have 
little impact on the proposal and arguments we make in this paper.
49
   Even 
if the Supreme Court agrees with Bowman’s arguments, that result would 
only immunize a small subset of farmers, leaving a majority of farmers who 
purchase or license non-commodity GM seeds open to liability.  In short, 
however the Supreme Court rules in Bowman, future generations of GM 
seed patents will raise the same legal and policy issues that our proposal 
seeks to remedy. 
 
I.  PATENTS, FARMERS, AND INFRINGMENT 
 To appreciate the problem and proposed solution, it is helpful to 
have an understanding of what the patented technology is and how it may 
be infringed.  In this section, we describe the patents currently involved in 
the GM seed litigation and then delineate the three types of farmers who 
may infringe these patents.  Finally, we illustrate the actions these farmers 
may take that expose them to liability. 
 
                                                          
47
 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, No. 11-796 (U.S. argued Feb. 19, 2013). 
48
 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 420 
(Oct. 5, 2012) (No. 11-796). 
49
 Bowman’s argument that the sale of seed extinguished Monsanto’s claim for patent 
infringement is based on a very narrow set of facts.  Specifically, although Bowman had 
legitimately purchased GM seed in the past, he later purchased GM seed from a grain 
elevator as a commodity sale.  Id. at 1345-46.  He later saved seed from that resulting crop 
and replanted it the following year.  Id.  Bowman first argues that the unrestricted 
commodity sale extinguished the claim for patent infringement.  This argument is based on 
Monsanto’s admission that the Technology Agreement does not prohibit “unrestricted seed 
sales to grain elevators as a commodity.”  Id. at 1345.  Bowman’s second argument is that 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit erred when it held that even if the commodity 
sale exhausted Monsanto’s rights in its seeds, Bowman infringed by growing a new 
generation of crops and producing a new generation of GM seed.  Id. at 1348.  Monsanto, 
of course, strongly disagrees.  See Brief for Respondents, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 
11-796 (Jan. 2013), 2013 WL 179941.   Monsanto is likely to solve these potential 
obstacles by amending its Technology agreement to prohibit commodity sales.  If the Court 
adopts Mr. Bowman’s first argument, but rejects his second, then this will have little effect 
on our proposal because it will only allow farmers to redistribute commodity seeds.  Any 
planting of them would result in infringement by producing a new seed. 
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A.  Monsanto’s Patents 
Monsanto “produces genetically modified and patent-protected seed 
in large-acre crops, including corn, cotton, soybeans, and canola.”50  The 
seed genes are altered to increase plant yield and, most importantly, 
immunize them to Roundup, Monsanto’s herbicide.51  Thus, these GM 
seeds are also called Roundup Ready.
52
  These technologies are largely 
protected by two U.S. patents.
53
  In these two patents, Monsanto claims the 
following: (1) glyphosate-tolerant plants (i.e. herbicide-resistant plants); (2) 
genetically modified seeds for glyphosate-tolerant plants; (3) the specific 
modified genes; and (4) the method of producing these GM plants.
54
 
 
B.  Infringing Farmers 
Farmers in the United States provide American consumers with 
more than eighty percent of the food consumed each year.
55
  The industry 
represents one in twelve American jobs
56
 and occupies roughly one fifth of 
the nation’s land (382 million acres) for crop production and an additional 
one fourth of her land (525 million acres) for livestock grazing.
57
   
There are three types of farmers who could be liable for patent 
infringement and a variety of actions by these farmers may lead to liability.  
                                                          
50
 Ma, supra note 29, at 694.  
51
 Id. at 701. 
52
 Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
53
 See generally U.S. Patent No. 5,633,435 (filed Sept. 13, 1994) and U.S. Patent No. 
5,352,605 (filed Oct. 28, 1993). 
54
 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Patent 
No. 5,633,435 (filed Sept. 13, 1994) and U.S. Patent No. 5,352,605 (filed Oct. 28, 1993).  
Monsanto’s Canadian patents are similar.  As described in Monsanto v. Schmeiser, the 
claims in the Canadian patent include: (1) a chimeric gene: this is a gene that does not exist 
in nature and is constructed from different species; (2) an expression vector: this is a DNA 
molecule into which another DNA segment has been integrated so as to be useful as a 
research tool); (3) a plant transformation vector: used to permanently insert a chimeric gene 
into a plant’s own DNA; (4) various species of plant cells into which the chimeric gene has 
been inserted; [and] (5) a method of regenerating a glyphosate-resistant plant.  Once the 
cell is stimulated to grow into a plant, all of the differentiated cells in the plant will contain 
the chimeric gene, which will be passed on to offspring of the plant.  Monsanto Canada, 
Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.J. 902, 915-16 (Can.). 
55
 U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Accomplishments 2009-2012: Agriculture (2012), 
http://www.usda.gov/documents/Results-Ag-Production.pdf. 
56
 Id. 
57
 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Land Use Overview, Ag 101 (June 27, 
2012), http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/ag101/landuse.html. 
10 U. Colo. L. Rev. [85:2 
Each category of farmers and the actions they may take are discussed in 
turn below. 
 
1.  Types of Farmers 
The three types of farmers who could be liable for patent 
infringement are: (1) the drift farmer; (2) the direct purchasing farmer; and 
(3) the indirect purchasing farmer.   
 
a.  Drift Farmers 
The first category is the drift farmer.
58
  Drift farmers are arguably 
the most sympathetic of the infringers.  The drift farmers find themselves 
using the patented genetic sequence and growing the patented plant when it 
either drifts into their field through natural pollination processes (such as 
via wind, animals, plants, and ocean currents
59
) resulting in cross 
pollination of GM varieties with non-GM varieties or through the 
germination of GM seeds dropped in transit or blown into fields.
60
  Pollen 
from plants containing a GM sequence can be carried as far as twenty-one 
kilometers (thirteen miles) by the wind
61
 and over three miles by bees.
62
  
                                                          
58
 For a case about inadvertent infringement that garnered worldwide attention, see 
Monsanto Canada, Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.J. 902 (Can.).  After Schmeiser’s 
neighbors began using GM seed, he claimed he was the victim of “drift.”  That is, despite 
Schmeiser not buying or planting GM seed, by 1998 the vast majority of his canola crop 
was made up of GM plants that resulted from seed that drifted from other farmers’ crops.  
Id. at 912.  Specifically, Schmeiser claimed that the GM plants “derived from [GM seed] 
that blew onto or near Schmeiser’s land, and was then collected from plants that survived 
after Schmeiser sprayed Roundup herbicide around the power poles and in the ditches 
along the roadway bordering four of his fields.”  Id.  Thus, Schmeiser found himself in the 
tenuous position of using – albeit inadvertently – a technology patented by Monsanto 
without having paid the license fee.  Id.  In 1998, “Monsanto got an anonymous tip that 
Schmeiser had an unauthorized field brim-full of the company’s Roundup Ready canola.” 
Colby Cosh, Percy Schmeiser, stubborn foe of genetically modified crops: His struggle 
against a patent suit launched by Monsanto has made him an unlikely hero, THE 
VANCOUVER SUN, May 22, 2004, at A.8.  An investigator from Monsanto went to 
Schmeiser’s farm and confirmed that over 95% of Schmeiser’s canola crop was Roundup 
Ready.  Schmeiser, 1 S.C.J. at 912.  Monsanto sued Schmeiser for patent infringement, 
claiming he had intentionally harvested and reused Roundup Ready seed without a license.  
Id.  Monsanto won the case, but the court refused to award damages.  Id. at 937-39. 
59
 Ma, supra note 29, at 703. 
60
 S. Smyth et al., Liabilities and Economics of Transgenic Crops, 20 NATURE BIOTECH. 
537, 537 (2002), available at 
http://www.dnai.org/media/bioinformatics/ccli/CD/readings/smythetal2002.pdf. 
61
 Lidia S. Watrud et al., Evidence for Landscape-Level, Pollen-Mediated Gene Flow from 
Genetically Modified Creeping Bentgrass with CP4 EPSPS as a Marker, 101 PROC. NAT’L 
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Agricultural research has confirmed the presence of unintended gene flow 
into heritage crop lines, related wild varieties and even weeds.
63
  Heritage 
crop lines are those used by organic farmers, who jealously guard their 
crops – and seed – against laboratory-derived genetic modification.  The 
cross-pollination and hybridization between seed varieties can happen 
extremely quickly; farmers in Canada discovered plants resistant to three 
different herbicide products (each uniquely patented by its respective IP 
owner) within two years of introduction of single-herbicide resistant seeds 
to the area.
64
  In its 2001 Prospectus leading up to its initial public offering, 
Monsanto itself listed the “possible presence of unintended biotechnology 
material” in conventional seeds among the market risks it considered 
material to investors, and the firm has continued to list the “adventitious 
presence” of biotechnology traits as a risk factor in subsequent federal 
filings.
65
  
 
 b.  Direct Purchasing Farmers 
 The second category is the direct purchasing farmer.  Monsanto 
licenses its patented technology to seed companies, who incorporate it into 
their germplasm and produce Roundup Ready seeds.
66
  As part of the 
license agreement, the seed companies are not permitted to sell this GM 
seed to farmers unless the farmers sign a license agreement that restricts 
                                                                                                                                                   
ACAD. SCI. 14,533, 14,533 (2004), available at 
http://www.pnas.org/content/101/40/14533.full.pdf+html. 
62
 EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS (GMOS): THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF GENE FLOW THROUGH POLLEN TRANSFER 16 (Copenhagen 2002). 
63
 A. Piñeyro-Nelson et al., Transgenes in Mexican maize: molecular evidence and 
methodological considerations for GMO detection in landrace populations, 18 
MOLECULAR ECOLOGY 750, 759 (2009); David Quist & Ignacio Chapela, Transgenic DNA 
Introgressed into Traditional Maize Landraces in Oaxaca, Mexico, 414 NATURE 541 
(2001); Diana Pilson & Holly R. Prendeville, Ecological Effects of Transgenic Crops and 
the Escape of Transgenes into Wild Populations, 35 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 
SYS. 149, 150 (2004); Norman C. Ellstrand et al., Gene Flow and Introgression from 
Domesticated Plants into their Wild Relatives, 30 ANN. REV. ECOLOGICAL SYS. 539 (1999); 
M.L. Zapiola et al., Escape and Establishment of Transgenic Glyphosate-resistant 
Creeping Bentgrass Agrostis Stolonifera in Oregon, USA: A 4-year Study, 45 J. APPLIED 
ECOL. 486 (2008); NORMAN C. ELLSTRAND, DANGEROUS LIAISONS? WHEN CULTIVATED 
PLANTS MATE WITH THEIR WILD RELATIVES passim (2003). 
64
 Smyth et al., supra note 60, at 538. 
65
 Monsanto Company, Prospectus (Filing Date: 2000-10-19) 13 (2001); Monsanto 
Company 10-K (Filing Date 2001-03-26) 2 (2001); Monsanto Company, 10-K (Filing Date: 
2002-03-05) 20 (2002); Monsanto Company, 10-K (Filing Date: 2003-03-13) 21 (2003). 
66
 Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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what the farmers may do with the crops.
67
  Direct purchasing farmers are 
those who purchase seed from an authorized seed company and execute a 
license agreement with Monsanto.
68
 
 The license agreement signed by the direct purchasing farmers 
imposes certain restrictions on the farmers, including: (1) prohibiting the 
use of the GM seed for planting a commercial crop for more than a single 
season; (2) prohibiting farmers from supplying the GM seed to others for 
planting; (3) prohibiting farmers from saving the GM seed for replanting or 
supplying it to others for replanting; and (4) prohibiting farmers from using 
the GM seed or supplying it to others for crop breeding, research, 
generation of herbicide registration data, or seed production.
69
 
 
c.  Indirect Purchasing Farmers 
 The third category is the indirect purchasing farmer.  The indirect 
purchasing farmer purchases the GM seed, but not from an authorized seed 
company and does not sign a license agreement with Monsanto.  Instead, 
the indirect purchasing farmer obtains the GM seed (and perhaps non-GM 
seed) from grain elevators as a commodity purchase.  The GM seed 
acquired by the indirect purchasing farmer may have been supplied to the 
grain elevator from a direct purchasing farmer or a drift farmer.
70
 
 
2.  Potentially Infringing Activities 
The Patent Act declares that “whoever without authority makes, 
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the 
patent.”71  As applied to the above-described farmers, there are three actions 
they may take with respect to the patented seeds and plants that could 
expose them to liability.  These actions include: (1) growing the crops with 
this patented gene; (2) growing the crop, saving some of the seed, and 
replanting it during the next growing season; and (3) growing the crop, 
saving some of the seed, and selling it to others to plant or otherwise use.  
Each action is discussed in turn below. 
 
                                                          
67
 Id. 
68
 See e.g. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 
1328; Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
69
 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 
S. Ct. 420 (Oct. 5, 2012) (No. 11-796). 
70
 See e.g. id. at 1345-46. 
71
 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
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a.  Growing Crops 
 Farmers who grow GM crops without a license may be committing 
patent infringement because growing the GM crops may constitute making 
or using the patented invention.  This is of concern for drift farmers and 
indirect purchasing farmers.
72
  These farmers are using the patented seeds 
by planting them and are making the patented invention when they grow a 
GM seed because the GM seeds are self-replicating.
73
  Importantly, patent 
infringement is a strict liability offense; no intent is required to infringe.
74
  
Thus, that the drift farmers or indirect purchasing farmers did not know they 
were using or making patented GM seed is of no consequence.
75
 
One type of drift farmer who could infringe by growing crops is the 
organic farmer, who is the most sympathetic infringer.  To some, Monsanto 
should be cast as the villain – polluting the organic farmer’s crop – and it 
seems unfair that when a farmer has taken no action to infringe a patent, 
liability may be lurking around the corner.  This is particularly appalling in 
the case of organic farmers who inadvertently use GM seed because doing 
so may actually harm their livelihood.
76
  Indeed, in any other context, where 
one “pollutes” the crops of another, it would be the polluter that faces a 
lawsuit.
77
 
                                                          
72
 It is not a concern for direct purchasing farmers because they have a license from 
Monsanto to plant the seeds and grow the crops for a single season.  See supra text 
accompanying note 69. 
73
 Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1348 (holding that an indirect purchasing farmer infringed because 
“once a grower, like Bowman, plants the commodity seeds containing Monsanto’s 
Roundup Ready technology and the next generation of seed develops, the grower has 
created a newly infringing article.”). 
74
 Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1575, 1590 (2011). 
75
 Lack of notice is relevant in the determination of damages when the product has not been 
properly marked under § 287(a).  Infringing farmers are unlikely able to take advantage of 
this mitigating defense because Monsanto presumably marks the package or provides a 
label with the proper notice attached.  See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a).  The Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit avoided answering this question in Bowman, because Monsanto had 
given actual notice to Bowman.  Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1349.  Even though drift farmers or 
indirect purchasing farmers may have never had the opportunity to see the notice, this 
defense will probably be unavailable to them as long as Monsanto or its seed distributors 
properly labeled the bags.  See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent 
Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 64 (2001) (“[E]ven when the plaintiff properly 
marks all of the articles she makes and sells, there is no requirement that the defendant 
actually encounter any of those articles.”). 
76
 7 C.F.R. § 205.202(b) (2012). 
77
  To opponents of GMO technology, this drift of GMO traits onto others’ land and crop 
property has been characterized as “genetic pollution.”  Scott Kilman & Jill Carroll, 
Monsanto Admits Unapproved Seed May Be in Crops, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2002, at A3. 
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Whether such liability exists for inadvertent infringement is an open 
question in patent law.
78
  Judge Gajarsa, in a concurring opinion, wrote:  
 
This [patented] compound raises a question similar to one 
that might arise when considering the invention of a fertile 
plant or a genetically engineered organism, capable of 
reproduction, released into the wild.  Consider, for example, 
what might happen if the wind blew fertile, genetically 
modified blue corn protected by a patent, from the field of a 
single farmer into neighboring cornfields.  The harvest from 
those fields would soon contain at least some patented blue 
corn mixed in with the traditional public domain yellow corn 
– thereby infringing the patent.  The wind would continue to 
blow, and the patented crops would spread throughout the 
continent, thereby turning most (if not all) North American 
corn farmers into unintentional, yet inevitable, infringers.
79
 
 
Although Judge Gajarsa believed no liability should be found, the 
majority avoided addressing this issue, leaving it open for another court to 
consider.  For now, liability for the drift farmer is still a threat. 
Drift farmers find the threat of liability quite real.  In Organic Seed 
Growers and Trade Association v. Monsanto Co.,
80
 a group of organic and 
non-organic farmers who do not want to grow or use GM crops or sell GM 
seed filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that they are 
not infringing Monsanto’s patents when the GM seed inevitably 
contaminates the plaintiffs’ non-GM crops.81  The farmers fear that the 
inadvertent growth of GM plants could trigger liability.
82
  Although 
Monsanto declared that its policy is “not to exercise [its] patent rights over 
inadvertently acquired trace amounts of patented seed or traits,”83 Monsanto 
refused to respond to a request that Monsanto expressly waive any claim for 
                                                          
78
 Holman’s Biotech IP Blog, http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/organic-
seed-growers-and-trade.html (June 1, 2011, 9:38 AM) (“To my knowledge, this issue has 
never been directly addressed by the courts.”). 
79
 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1360-61 (2005) 
(Gajarsa, J., concurring). 
80
 Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012), appeal docketed, No. 2012-1298 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (argued Jan. 10, 2013). 
81
 Id. at 547-48. 
82
 Id. at 549.   
83
 Id. at 549-50.  
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patent infringement against the plaintiffs.
84
  Unsatisfied and still fearful that 
they could be liable for infringement, the farmers filed suit.
85
   
 
b.  Saving Seed and Replanting 
Farmers who grow GM crops, save some of the seed, and replant it 
during the next growing season may be committing patent infringement.  
The saving seed and replanting conduct applies to all three categories of 
farmers and is the most common type of case being brought by Monsanto.
86
  
In particular, saving and replanting the GM seed infringes the patentee’s 
exclusive right to make and use the patented technology.
87
 
 The drift farmer who grows the crop, saves some of the seed, and 
replants it during the next growing season is infringing because GM seeds 
are being used by the farmer to grow the crops, and because the GM seeds 
are self-replicating, new generations of GM seed are made by the farmer.  
All of this is done without a license from Monsanto to the drift farmer.  One 
example is Percy Schmeiser.
88
  Schmeiser claimed that GM seeds from 
neighboring farms drifted onto his farm.
89
  He took advantage of the 
situation, harvesting the resulting GM plants, saving the seeds they 
produced, and using them in the next growing season.
90
  To be sure, 
Schmeiser is not as sympathetic as the organic farmers who actively avoid 
having their crops contaminated by GM plants because, as the court stated, 
Schmeiser had reason to know that his crop had been polluted with GM 
seed.
91
  Nonetheless, because Schmeiser never purchased the seed nor 
agreed to a restrictive license agreement,
92
 he was simply guilty of taking 
advantage of naturally occurring processes or processes put in motion by 
others.
93
 
                                                          
84
 Id. 
85
 Id. at 550.  
86
 See e.g. Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto Co. v. David, 
516 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 
2007); Monsanto Co. v. Hargrove, 2011 WL 5330674 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2011); Monsanto 
Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 420 (Oct. 5, 
2012) (No. 11-796); Monsanto Canada, Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.J. 902 (Can.). 
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 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
88
 Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.J. at 930, 937.  For a full recitation of the facts in Schmeiser, see 
supra note 58. 
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 Id. at 937.  
90
 Id. at 930, 937.  
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 Id. at 933-34.  
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 Id. at 912.  
93
 Id. at 933-34.  
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The direct purchasing farmer infringes by saving and replanting GM 
seed because, as discussed above, although the direct purchasing farmer has 
permission to use the GM seed, the license agreement imposes various 
restrictions on farmers, including prohibiting them from saving the GM 
seed for replanting.
94
  Thus, replanting the second generation GM seed 
infringes the patentee’s right to make and use the patented technology.95  
One case discussing a direct purchasing farmer who saves GM seed is 
Ralph, discussed in the Introduction.
96
  Another example of the direct 
purchasing farmer who saves GM seed and replants it is Monsanto Co. v. 
McFarling.
97
  McFarling purchased GM soybean seeds in 1998 and signed 
the license agreement.
98
  In violation of the agreement, McFarling saved 
seeds from the 1998 crop and replanted them in 1999.
99
  In 1999, he saved 
the GM seeds and replanted them in 2000.
100
  McFarling was sued by 
Monsanto for infringing its patents and Monsanto’s motion for summary 
judgment on liability was granted.
101
 
The indirect purchasing farmer who infringes on patent protected 
seed lines by saving and replanting GM seed without signing a new license 
agreement is exemplified by Vernon Bowman.
102
  Bowman purchased 
commodity seed, “a mixture of undifferentiated seeds harvested from 
various sources,” which may contain GM seed.103  Bowman saved the seeds 
resulting from his commodity-based crops and replanted them in subsequent 
years.
104
  As a result, Monsanto sued Bowman for patent infringement, was 
granted for summary judgment, and was awarded $84,456.20.
105
 
Finding that the saving and replanting of seeds is patent 
infringement has an additional consequence – the law is threatening a basic 
                                                          
94
 See supra text accompanying note 69.  
95
 See e.g. Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto Co. v. David, 
516 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 
2007); Monsanto Co. v. Hargrove, 2011 WL 5330674 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2011); see also 35 
U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
96
 Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1377.  
97
 See McFarling, 488 F.3d at 976. 
98
 Id. at  976. 
99
 Id.  
100
 Id.  
101
 Id. at 976-77. 
102
 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 420 
(Oct. 5, 2012) (No. 11-796). 
103
 Id. at 1345-46.  Mr. Bowman had previously been a direct purchasing farmer, but 
complied with the terms of the license agreement.  Id. at 1345.  
104
 Id. at 1345-46. 
105
 Id. at 1346.  
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component of post-nomadic agriculture.
106
  Over time, farmers have 
developed techniques for naturally selecting and perpetuating desirable 
traits, such as resistance to drought or pests and plants that produce higher 
yields.
107
  The impulse to save seed is encoded in the farming community’s 
collective memory.
108
  Today, farmers in the United States carry on the 
tradition, saving seed from their best plants, from year to year, to produce 
“locally-adapted seed varieties.”109  Saving seed also provides farmers – and 
thus our food supply – with independence, by “ensure[ing] sufficient 
growing materials for future seasons.”110  Despite centuries of tradition of 
replanting seed, because GM seed replicates, this activity has become an 
expensive violation of the law.  Moreover, “[t]here is no harvesting system 
in place in the world that is capable of containing all the seeds produced on 
a plot of land.” 111 It is estimated that greater than 1,000 seeds per acre will 
remain in any given farming field; these seeds will germinate naturally the 
following season.
112
 When these residual seeds are GM strains, the resulting 
so-called “volunteer crops” must be controlled.113 Mitigation through 
chemical treatment (an option unavailable to organic farmers) can come at a 
cost ranging from between $1 to $1.31 per acre for GM canola to $4.07 per 
acre for GM wheat.
 114
 
 
c.  Saving and Selling Seed 
 The final activity that may cause farmers to infringe Monsanto’s 
patents is saving the GM seed and selling it to others.
115
  There are two 
types of sales that may occur.  First is selling the seed for planting purposes, 
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 Jeremy P. Oczek, Note, In the Aftermath of the “Terminator” Technology Controversy: 
Intellectual Property Protections for Genetically Engineered Seed and the Right to Save 
and Replant Seed, 41 B.C. L. REV. 627, 647 (2000); Ma, supra note 29, at 694-95 (seed 
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 Smyth et al., supra note 60, at 538. 
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 Calculated using mitigation costs to Canadian farmers as described in Smyth et al., 
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Oanda.com. 
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 Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 2012 WL 3938852, *1 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 7, 2012). 
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often referred to as brown bag sales.
116
  Second is selling the seed for other 
purposes, such as for food (e.g. sunflower seeds intended as snacks).  Both 
types of sales may implicate the patentee’s exclusive right to sell or offer to 
sell the patented invention.
117
  Neither the drift farmer nor the indirect 
purchasing farmer has permission from Monsanto to grow the patented GM 
crops, much less sell them.  As a result, they do not have the ability to sell 
the seeds or plants for replanting or any other purpose.   
 The direct purchasing farmers are a bit different.  They have entered 
into a license agreement with Monsanto and, as described above, the current 
license only prohibits selling the GM seed to others for planting and saving 
the GM seed and supplying it to others for replanting.
118
  As a result, the 
direct purchasing farmer who sells GM seeds or plants to others for use as 
food is participating in an authorized activity and, thus, is not infringing the 
license as it is currently worded.
119
  Saving and selling GM seed becomes 
problematic when the direct purchasing farmer sells the GM seed to others 
so that they may subsequently plant it.  This is specifically prohibited in the 
license agreement.
120
 
In sum, the widespread use of GM technology in U.S. agriculture 
has had a powerful effect on farmers.  GM seeds are generally licensed for 
single seasons and unused seed cannot be reused in subsequent seasons 
without an additional license fee.
121
  A substantial number of defendants in 
patent cases filed by Monsanto have been found liable for this so-called 
“seed piracy” and been forced to pay extraordinary damages.122 
 
II.  EXAGGERATED REMEDIES FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
Breach of contract damages are meant to compensate the non-
breaching party by giving them the benefit of their bargain, nothing more.
123
  
                                                          
116
 Id. at *3 (discussing a $6.3 million award for infringing brown bag sales).  “‘Brown 
bag’ seed refers to the practice of a farmer buying commercial seed, planting the seed, 
harvesting the crop, cleaning the harvested crop seed and then replanting the saved seed or 
selling the seed to other farmers.”  Monsanto Co. v. Strickland, 604 F. Supp. 2d 805, 811 
n.1 (2009). 
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 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
118
 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 
S. Ct. 420 (Oct. 5, 2012) (No. 11-796). 
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 Id. at 1345.  
120
 See supra text accompanying note 69.  
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 See supra text accompanying note 69.  
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 See infra Part II.  
123
 Adams v. Lindblad Travel, Inc., 730 F.2d 89, 92 (2nd Cir. 1984) (Where one party 
breaches a contract, damages are measured by asking, “[what] is the amount necessary to 
put the plaintiff in the same economic position he would have been in had the defendant 
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Contract damages are focused on the particular individuals to a contract and 
consequently limited.
124
  Courts are not supposed to award contract 
damages “to punish the party in breach or to serve as an example to 
others.”125  As a result, windfalls are prohibited126 and punitive damages are 
generally not recoverable.
127
  Compare tort damages, which seek to fully 
compensate the injured party for the injury received,
128
 but also have a 
societal dimension.
129
  In particular, tort damages serve the purposes of 
compensating the injured party, punishing wrongdoers, and deterring 
wrongful conduct.
130
   
Patent infringement is generally thought of as a tort.
131
  The 
remedies for infringement are tort-like in that they provide for “damages 
adequate to compensate for the infringement.”132  As the Federal Circuit 
held in Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., “while the statutory text states tersely 
that the patentee receive ‘adequate’ damages [to compensate for the 
infringement], the Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that 
‘adequate’ damages should approximate those damages that will fully 
compensate the patentee for infringement.”133 
                                                                                                                                                   
fulfilled his contract.”); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1979) (Judicial 
remedies under the rules stated in this Restatement serve to protect one or more of the 
following interests of a promisee: (a) his “expectation interest,” which is his interest in 
having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been 
in had the contract been performed . . . .). 
124
 Prolific legal scholar Grant Gilmore argued: 
The [Holmes-Williston] theory seems to have been dedicated to the 
proposition that, ideally, no one should be liable to anyone for anything.  
Since the ideal was not attainable, the compromise solution was to 
restrict liability within the narrowest possible limits.  
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 14 (1974). 
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 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 cmt. a (1979). 
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 Paul v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 974 A.2d 140, 146 (Del. 2009). 
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 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1979). 
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 Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(tort damages are measured by asking, “had the tortfeasor not committed the wrong, what 
would have been the financial position of the person wronged?”). 
129
 Erie Ins. Exch. v. Abbott Furnace Co., 972 A.2d 1232, 1238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) 
(citing Reardon v. Allegheny College, 926 A.2d 477, 486-87 (Pa. Super. 2007)); 
Ilkhchooyi v. Best, 37 Cal. App. 4th 395 (4th Dist. 1995) (“tort damages are designed to 
vindicate social policy and to compensate the victim for injury suffered”). 
130
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1965). 
131
 N. Am. Philips Corp. v. Am. Vending Sales, Inc., 35 F.3d 1576, 1578-79 (Fed. Cir. 
1994); Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1221-22 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(“[P]atent infringement is a continuing tort.”). 
132
 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
133
 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing General 
Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1983)). 
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Yet the Patent Act’s provisions on remedies also contemplate 
contractual damages.
 134
  The Patent Act places a floor on the amount of 
compensation, providing that it shall be “in no event less than a reasonable 
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.”135  The 
reasonable royalty can be determined in one of two ways: (1) using an 
established royalty as a proxy for the reasonable royalty; or (2) using a 
hypothetical negotiation model.
136
 
As discussed below, courts in GM seed cases have rejected the 
established royalty measure and instead follow the hypothetical negotiation 
measure.
137
   But in doing so, they have tried to fully compensate the 
patentee under a tort paradigm which allows for deterrence and 
punishment.
138
  This leads to exaggerated damages
139
 and, because the 
infringing farmer is perceived as engaging in a tort, often injunctive 
relief.
140
 
 
A.  Rejecting Established Royalties 
A reasonable royalty can be based on an established royalty.
141
 An 
established royalty is what others actually pay for the right to use the patent.  
It is a proper measure “when the patentee has consistently licensed others to 
engage in conduct comparable to the defendant’s at a uniform royalty.”142  
                                                          
134
 See 35 U.S.C. § 284.  
135
 Id. 
136
 Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling, USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 
1340, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
137
 See infra Parts II.A and II.B. 
138
 See infra Parts II.A and II.B. 
139
 Love, supra note 25, at 917; Doug Lichtman, Understanding The Rand Commitment, 47 
HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 1036 (2010).  As pointed out by Professor Lichtman, courts do not 
award “reasonable” royalties in patent infringement cases.  Id.  “Quite the opposite, when a 
court decides that a valid patent has been infringed, the court typically imposes a remedy 
the net value of which clearly exceeds the value of any deal the parties would have made 
had they negotiated a license prior to the infringement.”  Id. at 1035.  The reasons for 
courts to award exaggerated royalties are several: (1) it encourages infringers to settle 
rather than face an award of exaggerated royalties; (2) it discourages patent infringement in 
the first place by making it cheaper to agree to a reasonable patent ex ante, then to wait and 
face an award of exaggerated damages; (3) it compensates the patent holder for the time 
and effort of proving that the patent is valid, and infringed. Id. at 1036-41. 
140
 See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 
1837 (2006): A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 631, 654 (2007) (“One clear conclusion, based on the data, is that most courts 
continue to grant permanent injunctions for patent infringement after eBay.”). 
141
 Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, 699 F.3d at 1357. 
142
 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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“[T]hat royalty is taken as established and indicates the terms upon which 
the patentee would have licensed the defendant’s use of the invention.”143  
This approach has the advantage of “remov[ing] the need to guess at the 
terms to which parties would hypothetically agree,” as is required when the 
hypothetical negotiation model is used to determine a reasonable royalty.
144
   
In the GM seed context, farmers have argued that the technology fee is the 
established royalty.
145
  The technology fee is the portion of the invoiced 
price equivalent to licensing the GM seed in that bag for the present 
growing season.  In the late 1990s and into 2000, the technology fee was 
approximately $5.00 or $6.50 per bag of soybean seed.
146
  In 2003, it was 
$7.75 per bag.
147
 
Despite the technology fee’s existence, it has consistently been 
rejected as an established royalty in the GM seed context, at least in cases 
where the farmer is accused of saving seed from year to year.
148
   While 
farmers argue that the technology fee is an established royalty, the courts 
counter that the technology fee is limited to the use of the GM seed in that 
particular bag for the present growing season only.
149
  The courts reason 
that a farmer who was negotiating for use of one bag of seed and use of the 
seed produced by that one bag of seed would pay more than the traditional 
technology fee.
150
  The technology fee and the license that would be 
required to cover the infringing material are not the same; the second would 
be a broader license and hence more expensive. 
Again, Monsanto Co. v. Ralph is illustrative.
151
  Recall that “Ralph 
purchased 264 fifty-pound bags of soybean seed [in 1998] containing the 
patented Roundup-Ready biotechnology.”152  Ralph infringed Monsanto’s 
patent by saving seed for use during the next planting season and Monsanto 
sued Ralph for patent infringement.
153
  The court rejected Ralph’s argument 
                                                          
143
 Id. 
144
 Id. 
145
 Id. 
146
 Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004); McFarling, 488 F.3d at 
976; Monsanto Co. v. Swann, 308 F. Supp. 2d 937, 939 (E.D. Mo. 2003). 
147
 Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  Monsanto stopped 
listing the technology fee separately on invoices for Roundup Ready seed in 2002. 
148
 See e.g. id. at 1018 (“the technology fee is not an established royalty for the infringing 
act of saving seed”). 
149
 Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1380. 
150
 Even a single bag of the soybean seed improperly acquired “could therefore, by a 
conservative estimate, produce hundreds of thousands of bags of seed (i.e., [55 x 55 x 55 = 
166,375]) over the course of just three growing seasons.”  Id. 
151
 Id. at 1377.  
152
 Id.  
153
 Id. at 1377-78.   
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that the “standard Technology Fee that Monsanto charges all farmers is ‘the 
most established royalty patent infringement litigation has ever seen”154 and 
that the court should take the total number of bags of seed he recovered 
over the two years and multiply that by the per bag technology fee, i.e., 
(696+438) * $5/bag = $6,170.
155
  The court found that Ralph’s use of the 
patent was broader than what the technology fee would cover.
156
  The court 
also seemed concerned that simply using the technology fee as an 
established royalty would not result in adequate deterrence; if it awarded 
only $6,170 in damages, future farmers would have no incentive to follow 
the law.
157
  Future farmers could infringe the patent and pay the royalty fee 
only if they got caught.
158
   
Such reasoning ignores the other incentives farmers have to act 
lawfully and pay the technology fee.
159
  First, this reasoning overlooks the 
Patent Act’s expressly designed tool to discourage blatant infringement – 
the ability to award treble damages for willful infringement.
160
  A farmer 
who deliberately decides to use the GM seed without paying the technology 
fee “would almost certainly qualify as a willful infringer and face up to 
treble damages.”161  In Ralph, a reasonable royalty of $6,170 would have 
been trebled to $18,510 for deterrent and punishment effect.
162
 
A second incentive farmers have for paying the technology fee 
rather than opting for infringement is that they may be preliminarily 
enjoined from growing and selling the infringing crops.
163
  Taking the risk 
that one’s farm will be temporarily shut down “may, in many cases, be the 
most powerful infringement deterrent of all.”164 
                                                          
154
 Id. at 1383.  
155
 Id. at 1379.  
156
 Id.  
157
 Id.  
158
 Love, supra note 25, at 919 (quoting Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1109 
(Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
159
 See id. at 924.  
160
 Id. at 925; 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“the court may increase the damages up to three 
times the amount found or assessed.”).  
161
 Love, supra note 25, at 926.  
162
 See Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1379; 35 U.S.C. § 284.  In Monsanto Co. v. Roeder, the court 
suggested this logical approach, but Monsanto argued that such a limitation would not be 
proper and the court relented.  Monsanto Co. v. Roeder (In re Roeder), 2009 WL 4907014, 
*11 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Dec. 14, 2009). 
163
 Love, supra note 25, at 927; but see Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 
2743 (2010) (concluding that a preliminary injunction was inappropriate despite a 
likelihood of success of showing the Department of Agriculture violated the National 
Environmental Policy Act); Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(same). 
164
 Love, supra note 25, at 927. 
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A third incentive farmers have for avoiding infringement and 
voluntarily choosing to pay the technology fee is the cost of patent 
infringement litigation.
165
  Not only would farmers have their own costs 
(attorneys’ fees, expert witness fees, and lost time), but the Patent Act 
permits courts to award attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties in “exceptional 
cases.”166  Willful infringement is one factor courts consider in determining 
whether a case is exceptional.
167
  Patent litigation is notoriously 
expensive,
168
 which likely provides a strong incentive to avoid 
infringement.  Yet despite these built-in deterrents, the courts have rejected 
the established royalty method and opted for a more deterrent- and 
punishment-oriented approach. 
 
B.  Inflating the Hypothetical Negotiation 
Where an established royalty cannot be determined, the reasonable 
royalty may be “based upon the supposed result of hypothetical negotiations 
between the plaintiff and defendant.”169  This hypothetical negotiation 
method seeks to determine the terms of the license agreement the parties 
would have reached had they negotiated at arm’s length when infringement 
began.
170
   In the GM seed context, to estimate what the farmer would have 
                                                          
165
 Id. at 928. 
166
 Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 285. 
167
 Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 184 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
168
 Love, supra note 25, at 928 (citing AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF 
ECONOMIC SURVEY 2007, at 25-26). 
169
 Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling, USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 
1340, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012); i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 853 n.3 
(Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 180 L. Ed. 2d 131 (2011) (citing Georgia Pacific 
Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295, 297 (1971)). 
170
 Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“jury was 
instructed in the factors set forth in Georgia-Pacific for determination of a 
reasonable royalty”).  The Georgia Pacific factors include: 
(1) royalties the patentee has received for licensing the patent to others; 
(2) rates paid by the licensee for the use of comparable patents; (3) the 
nature and scope of the license (exclusive or nonexclusive, restricted or 
nonrestricted by territory or product type); (4) any established policies or 
marketing programs by the licensor to maintain its patent monopoly by 
not licensing others to use the invention or granting licenses under 
special conditions to maintain the monopoly; (5) the commercial 
relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as whether they are 
competitors; (6) the effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting 
sales of other products of the licensee; (7) the duration of the patent and 
license term; (8) the established profitability of the product made under 
the patent, including its commercial success and current popularity; (9) 
the utility and advantages of the patent property over old modes or 
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been willing to pay, courts focus on the estimated economic benefits 
enjoyed by the farmer.
171
  This makes sense.  A farmer would certainly 
consider potential economic gains when deciding the proper payment for 
the right to use the patented seed.   
However, courts also entertain considerations that have no place in a 
hypothetical negotiation, such as deterring future behavior.  One court – 
despite a lack of evidence supporting this allegation – opined that the 
farmer may effectively go into business against Monsanto, a company with 
assets in excess of $20 billion:
172
  
 
Because one Roundup Ready(R) soybean seed is capable, on 
average, of producing thirty to forty identical second 
generation seed, the farmer is capable of selling forty-times 
the seed originally purchased.  Given enough acreage, a 
farmer purchasing 1,000 bags of Roundup Ready(R) seed 
would be capable of bin-running or brown bagging 
39,304,000 bags within four years.  Thus Monsanto would 
only be willing to accept a royalty commensurate with the 
risk that a farmer could effectively become a direct Roundup 
Ready(R) soybean competitor to Monsanto in such a short 
time period.
173
   
 
                                                                                                                                                   
devices; (10) the nature of the patented invention and the benefits to 
those who have used the invention; (11) the extent to which the infringer 
has used the invention and the value of that use; (12) the portion of profit 
or of the selling price that may be customary in that particular business to 
allow for use of the invention or analogous inventions; (13) the portion of 
the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as opposed to 
its non-patented elements; (14) the opinion testimony of qualified 
experts; and (15) the results of a hypothetical negotiation between the 
licensor and licensee. 
 i4i, 598 F.3d at 853 n.3 (citing Georgia Pacific, 446 F.2d at 297). 
171
 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 977, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (affirming $40 
royalty per bag of seed where farmer “saved $31 to $61 per bag of seed”); Monsanto Co. v. 
Hargrove, 2011 WL 5330674, *3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2011) (awarding a royalty based “on 
the estimated economic benefits enjoyed by defendants”); see Love, supra note 25, at 916-
18 (discussing how the court in McFarling based damages on what “the defendant has 
gained or lost by his unlawful acts.”). 
172
 Monsanto Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 42 (Oct. 19, 2012). 
173
 Monsanto Co. v. Byrd, 2000 WL 33952260, *6 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 2000).  If Monsanto 
priced their seed based upon the assumption that each licensee would be a potential 
competitor, the price would be prohibitively expensive. 
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To deter such hypothetical competition, the court found that an inflated 
reasonable royalty would be appropriate.
174
   That the courts are 
incorporating deterrence into their award of damages can be clearly inferred 
from the damage amounts.
175
  Indeed, they are “nudging the reasonable 
royalty formulation further and further away from the traditional willing 
licensor-willing licensee negotiation.”176 
An additional factor underlying all of the outcomes above is that in 
applying the hypothetical negotiation method to determine a reasonable 
royalty, courts refuse to consider that the farmer and Monsanto are partners 
in an arms-length negotiation.  The courts find that Monsanto can refuse to 
negotiate and thus abandon the essential assumption of a willing licensor-
willing licensee.
177
  By rejecting the assumption of a willing licensor-
willing licensee the court can abandon economic reality
178
 and embark on a 
journey serving deterrence and punishment rather than just compensation.  
Of course, the Patent Act already includes specific provisions to deter and 
                                                          
174
 Id. at *7.  Further, while the court may triple the reasonable royalty under section 284, 
some courts bring punishment into the calculation well before the treble damages phase, 
that is to say, they consider punishment in determining a reasonable royalty.  See Maxwell 
v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  One court told jurors that they 
should include in their calculation of reasonable royalties “other factors that might warrant 
higher damages,” and then tripled the reasonable royalty that the jurors came up with. See 
Love, supra note 25, at 920 (discussing Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1104).  On appeal, the Federal 
Circuit held that it was “not an abuse of discretion for the district court to instruct the jury 
to award in two separate amounts - first . . . the royalty that two willing parties would 
negotiate . . . and second . . . the increase in the damages . . . based on other relevant factors 
- what courts had previously instructed jurors to consolidate into a single damages award.”  
See id. at 920 (quoting Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1109). 
175
 See infra notes 181-88 and accompanying text; see also Monsanto Co. v. Strickland, 
604 F. Supp. 2d 805, 815 (D.S.C. 2009) (“[the damage expert’s] analysis is based upon the 
considerations outlined in Georgia-Pacific and focuses on the commercial success of 
Roundup Ready(R) seed technology and the importance of Monsanto protecting its patent 
rights.”).   
176
 Love, supra note 25, at 920. 
177
 Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The hypothetical 
negotiation is often referred to as a ‘willing licensor/willing licensee’ negotiation.  
However, this is an inaccurate, and even absurd, characterization when, as here, the 
patentee does not wish to grant a license.”). 
178
 Suzanne Michel, Bargaining for Rand Royalties in the Shadow of Patent Remedies Law, 
77 ANTITRUST L.J. 889 899 n.41 (2011) (citing Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent 
Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1185-86 n.163 (2009) (noting that 
“recent cases have highlighted that, as a legal matter, reasonable royalty awards may 
exceed the amount the parties would have agreed to” in the hypothetical negotiation and 
declaring that such “decisions make no economic sense”). 
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punish – courts can award treble damages for willful infringement179 and 
attorneys’ fees in “exceptional cases.”180  Because such provisions are 
already included in the Patent Act, this makes an inflated reasonable royalty 
even more inappropriate. 
The results are telling.  The court can find a reasonable royalty 
higher than the farmer’s anticipated profits, despite the fact that “no sane 
farmer would ever negotiate a royalty in excess of his anticipated 
profits.”181  Again, Monsanto Co. v. Ralph is illustrative.  Once the court 
decided not be bound by the established royalty of $5 per bag, or even a 
royalty that would be reached in a hypothetical negotiation, it settled on 
“$55.04 per bag for the 796 bags of soybean seed that Ralph saved for 
planting in 1999, [and] $52.12 per bag for the 438 bags of soybean seed he 
saved for 2000.”182  The damages for infringing the soybean patent were 
$66,639 and subsequently trebled to $199,918.
183
  Notice that there are two 
levels of deterrence and punishment here: the original inflated royalty of 
$55.04 per bag, and the trebling of that amount to 165.12 per bag.  Other 
courts have moved even higher to $100 per bag, trebled to $300 per bag.
184
  
Indeed, this type of inflated damage is repeated in case after case, leading to 
judgments against farmers in the amount of $3,052,800,
185
 $2,586,325,
186
 
and $2,410,206,
187
 and $1,105,102.50.
188
   
As a reference, in 2011, the median household income for farms 
specializing in cash grains such as corn or soybeans was a mere $76,301.
189
  
                                                          
179
 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).  Section 284 does not expressly require willfulness, but courts 
have held that a showing of willfulness is sufficient.  Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, 
Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1087 n.3 (2003). 
180
 35 U.S.C. § 285; see also Jon E. Wright, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced 
Damages – Evolution and Analysis, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 97, 102 (2001) (“[C]ourts 
used the treble damages provision to punish infringers for deliberate acts of infringement.  
The courts also used the available discretion to punish bad faith business tactics.”). 
181
 Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1384.  
182
 Id. at 1379.  
183
 Id.  
184
 Monsanto Co. v. Strickland, 604 F. Supp. 2d 805, 816 n.5, 818 (D.S.C. 2009) (seed 
purchased in 2004). 
185
 THE CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, MONSANTO V. U.S. FARMERS 33 (2005) (citing 
Monsanto Co. v. Anderson, Case No. 4:01:CV-01749  (S.D. Tex. June 4, 2003)). 
186
 Id. (citing Monsanto Co. v. Dawson, Case No. 98-CV-2004 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 19, 2001)). 
187
 Id. (citing Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 2003 WL 25276984 (E.D. Mo. July 9, 2003), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 382 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
188
 Monsanto Co. v. Hargrove, 2011 WL 5330674, *4 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2011). 
189
 U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv.  Farm Household Income: Median Farm 
Household Income up in 2011 and Forecast Higher in 2012 (2013), 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-household-well-being/farm-
household-income.aspx. 
forthcoming Jan. 2014] FOOD FOR THOUGHT 27 
In 2010, seed costs for these two grains as a percent of gross crop-derived 
income per acre amounted to 11% – 12% for conventional seeds and 22% – 
23% for branded GM seeds.
190
  When examined in terms of net returns per 
acre, the percentage grew to 18% – 24% for conventional seeds and 35% – 
51% for branded GM seeds.
191
  This means that a simple trebling of these 
costs by the court for branded GM seeds would amount to 105% – 153% of 
a farmer’s total crop-derived net income for the year, and says nothing of 
the impact of the trebling of seed bag costs that have been inflated by up to 
twenty times market rates before trebling.  By any standard, negotiated 
royalty rates that could consume upwards of twenty years’ worth of a 
farmer’s total household income go far beyond reasonable compensation 
and certainly would never be construed as a logical position on the part of a 
potential licensee in a willing licensor-willing licensee negotiation. 
 
C.  Injunctions 
 Despite the fact that courts award a reasonable royalty based on the 
assumption that the farmer was negotiating for the use of one bag of seed 
for the year of the infringement and use of the seed produced by that one 
bag of seed (i.e., the court is determining a reasonable royalty based on 
infringement this year, infringement next year, and into the future),
192
  
Monsanto often seeks an injunction against the future activity that the 
reasonable royalty is intended to cover.  As one defendant argued: 
 
[t]he absurdity of the Plaintiffs position is [clear when one 
considers that the court is awarding an inflated reasonable 
royalty of] $427,291.00 per brown bag seed sold.  
Obviously, the plaintiff is attempting to recover a mandatory 
ten-year license in which the Defendant is presumed to grow 
and sell seed as a competitor against the Plaintiff for ten 
years.  Yet the Defendant is prohibited from doing so by this 
Court’s [injunction].193  
 
                                                          
190
 Charles Benbrook, The Organic Center, The Magnitude and Impacts of the Biotech and 
Organic Seed Price Premium (December 2009), 
http://kohalacenter.org/publicseedinitiative/images/seedpricepremium.pdf. 
191
 Id. 
192
 Even a single bag of the soybean seed improperly acquired “could therefore, by a 
conservative estimate, produce hundreds of thousands of bags of seed (i.e., [55 x 55 x 55 = 
166,375]) over the course of just three growing seasons.”  Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 
F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
193
 Monsanto Co. v. Byrd, 2000 WL 33952260, *6 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 2000). 
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The court rejected the foregoing argument and permitted Monsanto to 
proceed to trial and argue that an inflated reasonable royalty is a proper 
amount of damages.
194
  In addition to these inflated damages, Monsanto 
also sought injunctive relief.
195
  This “result[s] in a windfall for the plaintiff 
because the damages are based on future infringements notwithstanding 
existence of the injunction preventing such infringements.”196  This practice 
is repeated across cases.
197
   
The impropriety of this practice was recognized long ago in a trade 
secret case where the Ninth Circuit explained that “[t]o enjoin future sales 
and at the same time make an award based on future profits from the 
prohibited sales would result in duplicat[ed] and inconsistent relief.”198  In 
addition, inflating damages to compensate for future infringement while 
enjoining the defendant from future infringement directly contradicts one of 
the four required elements for injunctive relief – “that remedies at law, such 
as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for [the irreparable] 
injury.”199  If monetary damages, in the form of inflated reasonable 
royalties, are being awarded to Monsanto, then these damages are 
necessarily adequate to compensate for the injury.
200
 
 Notwithstanding the duplicative relief and not satisfying the four-
part test for injunctive relief, the hardship visited upon farmers by 
preliminary and permanent injunctions is undeniable.  Farmers will 
generally be subject to a preliminary injunction, which effectively prevents 
them from farming during the pendency of the action.
201
  And even if 
farmers pay damages for past wrongs and are willing to enter into license 
                                                          
194
 Id. at *7.  
195
 Id. at *2.  
196
 Id. at *7.  
197
 See e.g. Monsanto Co. v. Hargrove, 2011 WL 5330674, *4 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2011) 
(awarding exaggerated damages and an injunction); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 2005 WL 
1490051, *2 (E.D. Mo. June 23, 2005) (jury awarded an inflated reasonable royalty of $40 
per bag and court granted a permanent injunction), aff’d, 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
198
 Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Min. and Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 144 (9th Cir. 
1965). 
199
 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).  The four-part test is that 
the “plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for 
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.”  Id. 
200
 See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 572-73, 582-83 (E.D. 
Va. 2007) (holding that the patentee’s willingness to enter into a license agreement with 
third parties and the defendant negating the existence of an irreparable injury and an 
inadequate remedy at law). 
201
 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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agreements for future planting seasons, the farmers may not be allowed to 
do so by Monsanto.  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held in 
McFarling that the permanent injunction against unlicensed use of GM seed 
did not require Monsanto to “license its technology to Mr. McFarling if it 
chooses not to.”202  In short, McFarling was prevented from earning a living 
during the pendency and after the conclusion of the case and faces a 
judgment of $375,000.
203
 
In sum, because the infringing farmers face damages based on a tort 
model, they are subject to damages that are inflated for deterrent or even 
punitive effect.  The typical farmer sued by Monsanto for patent 
infringement faces a “reasonable” royalty that is more than ten-times the 
established royalty.  For example, in Ralph, while the typical farmer paid a 
royalty of $5 per bag, Monsanto was awarded damages of $55.04 per bag, 
tripled to $165.12 per bag.
204
  The possibility of injunctive relief 
compounds this problem and interrupts a long-standing tradition of 
farming.
205
  A solution to this problem is necessary.  Drawing from the law 
regarding and practices of standard setting organizations (SSOs), we 
propose to solve this problem with the help of an implied license. 
 
III.  IMPLIED LICENSES VIA DE FACTO STANDARD 
ESSENTIAL PATENTS  
In this section, we argue that one way courts could deal with cases 
involving patentees seeking redress for unlicensed use of GM seed 
technology is to deem that the patents covering the technology in question 
meet the criteria to be classified as de facto standard essential patents (de 
facto SEP).  By this, we mean that certain stringent conditions have been 
met that makes infringing use of the underlying technology all but 
impossible to avoid.  Our argument for determination of de facto SEP status 
for a technology is an extension of the standard essential patent (SEP) 
designation, which plays a vital role in technological fields by allowing 
                                                          
202
 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see Monsanto Co. v. 
Ralph, 382 F.3d. 1374 (Fed Cir. 2004) (“the court entered a permanent injunction 
prohibiting Ralph’s “current and future purchase, acquisition, making, use, sale, offers to 
sell, brokering, transfer, cleaning, and/or reconditioning . . . of any seed containing 
Monsanto’s patented biotechnology . . . [or] planting, moving, collecting transferring, or 
obtaining, in any manner, any patented biotechnology in [his] possession, or under [his] 
control, wherever situated,” and ordering him to inventory and produce all patented 
biotechnology in his possession to Monsanto.”). 
203
 McFarling, 488 F.3d 973. 
204
 Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1379. 
205
 See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.  
30 U. Colo. L. Rev. [85:2 
other producers to build on the patented technologies by paying a licensing 
fee.  While SEP designation traditionally takes place through formal 
standard setting bodies, we argue that de facto SEP can be determined by 
the court by analyzing whether three stringent criteria, which reflect the 
peculiarities of seeds used in farming, have been satisfied.  By 
acknowledging the potential for a de facto SEP in the cases of some GM 
seed technology, an implied license can be formed, which shifts the case 
from a tort-based patent infringement suit to a breach of contract dispute.  
As a result, this would alter the damages regime of the case from one based 
in compensation, deterrence, and punishment (a torts approach), to one 
based solely in compensation (a contractual approach). 
 
A.  Standard Essential Patents and Standard Setting Organizations 
A standard, most often seen in technology-based industries, is “any 
set of technical specifications that either provides or is intended to provide a 
common design for a product or process.”206  Standards serve useful 
purposes because they may encourage interoperability, facilitate 
competition in replacement parts, and even promote social welfare.
207
 
Standardization may arise in a number of ways.
208
  One way is 
through standard setting organizations (SSOs).
209
  SSOs, which typically act 
to solve interoperability problems, operate via their members to “create 
standards that ensure that devices within a system will work together and 
communicate with each other in standardized, predictable ways.”210  
Standards that are formed through SSOs often entail bringing together 
multiple patented technologies owned by different patentees under one 
standard.
211
  But standards may also be formed around the technology of 
only one specific patentee.
212
  As an example:  
                                                          
206
 Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1896 (2002). 
207
 Id. at 1897. 
208
 Id. at 1898.  
209
 Id.  
210
 Edith Ramirez, Prepared Statement of The Federal Trade Commission Before the 
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Concerning “Oversight of the Impact on 
Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce Standard-Essential Patents,”  112th Cong. 4, 
(July 11, 2012). 
211
 Aija Elina Leiponen, Competing Through Cooperation: The Organization of Standard 
Setting in Wireless Telecommunications, 54 MGMT. SCI. 1904, 1906 (2008). 
212
 Timothy Simcoe, Standard Setting Committees: Consensus Governance for Shared 
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In the late 1970s, a firm called RSA obtained a number of 
extremely strong patents covering the basic methods of 
public key cryptography… [T]he significance of RSA’s 
invention and the scope of its patents led to the adoption of a 
number of specifications that required implementers to seek 
a license from RSA.
213
  
 
The potential impact of a technology becoming a standard – in terms of 
both revenue generation and technological impact for the IP holder
214
 – is 
why firms will exert substantial effort on standards development activity.
215
  
The result of this activity is that other members of the industry are pressured 
to use the technology in order to compete in the market; product offerings 
that do not adhere to the industry standard are less likely to be adopted by 
consumers and may be viewed as suspect.  Thus, one could argue that a 
broad definition of an SEP is a patent necessary to use the standard or a part 
thereof.
216
  SEPs as denominated by SSOs are known as de jure 
standards.
217
 
Before SSOs adopt standards covered by SEPs, they very frequently 
require the owners of those patents to commit to licensing their patents 
under reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms.
218
  This is because 
adoption of an SEP could endow the patent owner with disproportionate 
market power and permit it to “extract unreasonably high royalties from 
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suppliers [and users] of standard-compliant products and services.”219  
Requiring RAND licensing protects adopters and users of the standard from 
paying extraordinary high fees when there are no realistic opportunities to 
produce the product or provide the service without infringing the patent.
220
  
This RAND licensing requirement is commonplace.
221
 
But not all standards are created by SSOs.
222
  De facto standards 
may also emerge as a result of consumer preference.
223
  If a de facto 
standard emerges and is covered by a patent then the patent becomes a de 
facto standard essential patent (de facto SEP).  The owner of the de facto 
SEP, like the owner of the de jure SEP, may have increased market power. 
We argue that there should be no difference between the rights and 
responsibilities that arise from the creation of a de jure SEP and a de facto 
SEP.  In particular, we suggest that where patented technology necessary 
for the satisfaction of a human need reaches SEP status, a license should be 
implied between the patentee and those users who cannot practicably fulfill 
the need without infringing the patent.  This type of implied license would, 
like other licenses, be an affirmative defense.
224
  If established, this implied 
license would remove the possibility of damages being inflated for deterrent 
or punitive effect and remove the possibility of injunctions being granted. 
When applied to Monsanto’s GM seed litigation, we see Monsanto 
benefiting from the advantages of an SEP without taking on any of the 
reciprocal responsibilities.  Specifically, Monsanto’s technology has 
“become[] a de facto standard. . . controlled by [Monsanto], [giving 
Monsanto] significant power and control.”225  Where a given technology 
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achieves standard essential status without the determination of an SSO, it is 
not bound by any of the mitigating agreements that SSOs may put in place.  
These may include the agreement to grant a license on RAND terms to 
anyone using the patented technology on the part of the IP holder.
226
 
It is clear from a review of cases involving GM seeds, that the courts 
are reluctant to compel a license.  Given this, we narrowly tailor our 
proposal to create an implied license between the IP holder and the farmer 
only where certain strict conditions are met.  Specifically, we limit 
application of the de facto SEP model to cases where (1) the patent holder 
has achieved dominance in a given field; (2) it is impracticable to expect 
that a farmer could operate without infringing the patent; and (3) the farmer 
is growing a crop used to meet a basic human need.  In the following 
section, we further explain the elements for recognition of a de facto SEP. 
Before doing so, it is important to point out that the de facto SEP 
defense would not apply to farmers who knowingly acquire patented GM 
seed, plant it, and then knowingly sell the resulting crop (and second 
generation seed) to others for the purpose of replanting.
227
  This limitation 
would certainly exclude direct purchasing farmers who did this and may 
also exclude drift and indirect purchasing farmers who exploit their careful 
planning to compete with Monsanto.  Our proposal does not seek to 
legitimize a black market for infringing GM seed.  Instead, it attempts to 
minimize the harm to farmers who are producing products to satisfy basic 
human needs. 
 
B.  Establishing a De Facto SEP Regime for Genetically Modified 
Technology 
To succeed with an affirmative defense that the patent is a de facto 
SEP and that an implied license is appropriate, the farmer has the burden of 
establishing three elements.  These three elements are:  
 
1) Dominance: The patented technology has reached a 
dominant position in the relevant crop market; 
2) Impracticability:  Growing the relevant crop has become 
impracticable (or impossible) without use of the patented 
technology; and 
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3) Basic Need: The crop is necessary to supplying a basic 
need (food, shelter, or clothing).  
 
1.  Dominance 
The dominance element looks at whether the patented technology 
has reached a dominant position in the relevant crop market.  This 
dominance may occur due to open competition, anti-competitive behavior, 
lawful patent protection, tariffs, or other such barriers to access.  The 
specific question is: does the firm owning the patented technology have a 
sufficient amount of market power?  Antitrust law, which regularly needs to 
assess market power, helps answer that question.  The most commonly used 
surrogate for determining market power is to measure the market share and 
structure.
228
  Measuring market share requires the market to be defined in 
terms of the product and geography.
229
 
The product market should be defined as the crop being grown by 
the infringing farmer that is alleged to infringe the patent.  If the farmer 
grows soybeans and patented GM soybean seeds drift into the farmer’s 
field, then the product market is soybean seeds.  If the farmer grows cotton 
and patented GM cottonseeds are indirectly purchased from a commodities 
dealer, then the product market is cottonseed.  No distinction should be 
made between GM seed and non-GM seed. 
For geographic markets, the general question to ask is where do 
consumers look when purchasing a product?
230
  As applied to the infringing 
farmers, courts should look at where farmers in that community go to 
purchase their seed for the relevant crop.  Although this could vary 
depending on the product and consumers, the geographic market should 
probably be defined locally rather than regionally or nationally.  Ultimately, 
determining the geographic scope will be determined by the judge, but we 
anticipate that resolution of this issue will be informed by expert witness 
testimony and reports. 
Once the market has been defined, market share must be 
measured.
231
  This can be done by analyzing output within the market as 
either physical units or revenues as a percentage of all physical units or 
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 Id. at 64.  
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revenues.
232
  Once market share has been established, it must be determined 
whether this amount is sufficiently large to constitute dominance.   
We can use the Monsanto situation to show how this works.  
Monsanto’s dominance can best be understood in historical terms; for 
thousands of years, farmers have engaged in a selection process to find or 
create seed that could produce the highest quality product with the least 
effort and at the lowest cost.  As better seed became known, it displaced 
alternatives in the market.  It is estimated that over 90% of field corn seed 
varieties sold commercially in the U.S. in 1903 were extinct by 1983,
233
 the 
year when scientist Kary Mullis discovered how to produce multiple copies 
of specific fragments of a strand of DNA.
234
  As the decades passed, more 
and more farmers relied on fewer seed varieties
235
 while concurrently 
increasing productivity and quality. 
In the 1980s, after Diamond v. Chakrabarty
236
established the legal 
right to patent a genetically modified organism, property rights in 
agriculture shifted away from just the ownership of land and crops to 
ownership of specific gene sequences within seed and their progeny.
237
  
These sequences provided resistance to certain pests, brought yield gains, or 
encouraged the production of other such attractive crop characteristics.
238
  
Judging from market sales, one of the most valued characteristics afforded 
by genetic manipulation is resistance to herbicides, which is necessary to 
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kill weeds without killing the crop plant.
239
  Monsanto’s Roundup Ready 
seed, which allows for the liberal application of the Roundup herbicide 
without harm to the crop, holds the largest market share for such GM 
crops.
240
 
As a leading innovator in seed technology, Monsanto has taken 
numerous steps to increase the dominance of its products in the market.  In 
1996, Monsanto began a series of acquisitions of major seed companies, 
including Agracetus, Asgrow Agronomics, Asgrow and Stine Seed, 
Calgene, Inc., Cargill’s international seed divisions, DeKalb Genetics, Delta 
and Pine Land, Holden’s Foundation Seed, Inc., Monsoy, and Plant 
Breeding International.
241
 As a result of these efforts, Monsanto grew to 
become the second largest seed company behind Pioneer Hi-Bred (to whom 
it licenses its GM traits in a separate arrangement), controlling most of the 
soybean market and “almost half of the corn germplasm market in the 
U.S.”242 Monsanto now provides seed technology “for at least 90 percent of 
the world’s genetically engineered crops.”243 
At the same time that Monsanto has been increasing its market share 
to 90 percent of the world’s genetically engineered crops, the percentage of 
genetically engineered crops has likewise been growing.  “[A]s recently as 
1980, no genetically modified crops were grown in the United States.”244  
However, by 2009, “eighty-five percent of the corn cultivated in the United 
States, eighty-eight percent of the cotton, and ninety-one percent of the 
soybeans were genetically engineered.”245  The large market share 
Monsanto’s patented GM seeds play in the agriculture industry is certainly 
dominant for purposes of this proposed test. 
In United States v. Terminal Railroad Association, the Supreme 
Court expressed concern that “since the companies to the agreement now 
control about one third of the railroad mileage of the United States,” an 
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agreement that certain companies “obligate themselves to forever use the 
facilities of the terminal company for all business destined to cross the 
river…would seem to guarantee against any competitive system.”246  If 
control of one-third of the market was once considered problematic for the 
transport of freight, then control of market shares substantially above that 
level in the production of products necessary for life should also give us 
pause. 
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) have long used measures of market concentration for 
the purposes of antitrust enforcement.
247
  Although described in the context 
of horizontal mergers, the DOJ and FTC evaluate dominance with the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).
248
  The HHI sums the squares of the 
scrutinized firms’ market shares and adds them to give a final index 
number.
249
  In an industry with two firms, one with a 70% market share and 
one with a 30% share, the HHI would be 5800 (70²+30²).
250
  The DOJ and 
FTC consider an HHI of below 1500 to be unconcentrated.
251
  An HHI 
between 1500 and 2500 is moderately concentrated.
252
  And an HHI above 
2500 would be highly concentrated.
253
  As applied to some of the market 
shares described above for Monsanto, the HHI for some crops would be 
highly concentrated.
254
 
 
2.  Impracticability 
The second element of the de facto SEP defense is that growing the 
relevant crop has become impracticable (or impossible) without the use of 
the patented GM technology.  This element reflects the traditional definition 
of an SEP as a patent necessary to use the standard or a part thereof.
255
  In 
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particular, to satisfy this element, the farmer must show that if alternatives 
to GM crops are or had been available, that it was or would not have been 
reasonably possible to exclude the GM crops from the alternative crops.  
The impracticability element can be thought of as applying to three different 
scenarios.   
In the first scenario, unpatented seed is unavailable in the market 
and the farmer uses the patented GM seed.   This is not uncommon.  
Alternatives to GM seed are oftentimes not readily available.  According to 
a 2005 report by the Center for Food Safety (CFS), the availability of non-
GM seed has been drastically reduced as a result of Monsanto’s actions to 
buy competitors, license its technology to major seed sellers, and buy-out 
then close seed cleaners.
256
  Indiana soybean farmer Troy Roush tells CFS, 
“[y]ou can’t even purchase [heritage soybeans] in this market.  They’re not 
available.”257  Another farmer, who wished to remain anonymous, 
concurred, saying, “Just about the only cottonseed you can get these days is 
[genetically engineered].  Same thing with the corn varieties.  There’s not 
too many seeds available that are not genetically altered in some way.”258  
A survey of farmers in seven agricultural counties in Illinois revealed 
roughly 40% of farmers reported that they did not have any access to high-
yield potential non-GM corn seeds in 2009.
259
  On a county-by-county 
basis, lack of access ranged from 32% (Champaign county) to 46.6% (Malta 
county).
260
  This scenario would arise when dealing with direct purchasing 
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farmers and indirect purchasing farmers who grow crops, save seed, and 
replant it.  As applied to these farmers, because alternatives are unavailable, 
it is not reasonably possible to exclude the GM crops from the alternative 
crops.  In fact, it is impossible.  Lack of access to non-GM alternatives 
forces farmers to purchase GM seeds (and thus, license the technology) 
even when the farmer may not desire to utilize the GM properties. 
In the second scenario, unpatented seed is available and the farmer 
uses it, but the farmer’s crops are mixed with infringing crops.  This 
scenario would arise when dealing with drift farmers; direct purchasers, 
who end up with residual seeds in their fields which volunteer unplanned 
GM crops in future years; and indirect purchasing farmers, who 
unknowingly grow the GM crop and then save the seed and replant it.  Like 
the first scenario, the question is whether it is reasonable to exclude the GM 
crops from alternative crops.  But the inquiry is more fact-intensive. 
For the drift farmer, taking steps against pollen drift can be 
extremely expensive.
261
  Creating a buffer to prevent the unintended pollen 
drift is one option.
262
  One study “tracked the drift of pollen from blue corn 
and [GM] Roundup Ready corn into adjacent conventional corn.  Corn with 
marker traits (blue kernels or Roundup herbicide tolerance) was planted 
adjacent to corn without those traits.”263  Cross pollination was detected at 
600 feet.
264
  Based on these results, a 150 foot buffer was suggested to be a 
reasonable distance to protect against GM seed contamination.
265
  However, 
these buffer zones come with costs as they often take away otherwise arable 
land from productive crop use.
266
  Even with these precautions, drift may 
still occur.  Consider that corn pollen can travel one half mile.
267
 
Some methods of drift are produced by man.  Machinery used in 
harvesting and transportation can contaminate crops.  This may be the 
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farmer’s own machinery or, as in the case of Percy Schmeiser, 
contamination may come from other farmers’ trucks whose seed “fell from 
trucks carrying seed to grain elevators.”268  In the case of the farmer’s own 
machinery causing the contamination, extra costs are imposed on the farmer 
who must clean the machinery before passing from an area where GM seed 
is used to one where it is not.
269
  Of course, cleaning other farmers’ trucks 
to prevent contamination is not a workable solution. 
In the end, it may be impossible to prevent all GM crops from 
entering a non-GMO field.
270
  Researchers from the University of California 
at Berkeley reported the presence of “introgressed transgenic DNA 
constructs in native maize landraces grown in remote mountains in Oaxaca, 
Mexico.”271  That is, they found GM corn in what should have been a field 
without it.
272
  What made this discovery amazing is that the field was in the 
mountains, twenty miles from the nearest major road, in a country where it 
was illegal to plant GM corn.
273
 
 For the indirect purchasing farmer, one possible way to detect and 
reduce the likelihood of infringing the patent would be to conduct DNA 
testing on random samples of purchased crops.  Unfortunately, doing so to 
make sure GM plants are not being grown is extremely burdensome and 
costly.
274
   
In the third scenario, non-GM seed is available, but the farmer does 
not use it.  Instead, the farmer intentionally uses the patented GM seed.  
This scenario is especially pertinent to direct purchasing farmers and 
indirect purchasing farmers who know they are using patented GM seed.  
The impracticability inquiry in this scenario is slightly different than the 
first two scenarios.  Instead of asking whether it was reasonably possible to 
exclude the GM crops, the inquiry is a more speculative alternative universe 
inquiry.  That is, had the farmer who intentionally used the patented GM 
seed actually used public domain seed, would it have been unreasonable for 
the farmer to attempt to exclude the GM crops?  If so, the impracticability 
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Appellants in Support of Reversal at 10, Organic Seed Growers and Trade Ass’n v. 
Monsanto Co., No. 2012-1298 (Fed. Cir. July 11, 2012). 
forthcoming Jan. 2014] FOOD FOR THOUGHT 41 
element is satisfied even though alternatives were available and the farmer 
did not necessarily attempt to use them.
275
 
 
3.  Basic Need 
The third element for establishing a de facto SEP defense is that the 
crop is commonly used in supplying a basic need.  The rule that property 
rights – including patent rights – are inviolate pervades our law,276 yet that 
rule begins to show cracks when it calls into question the supply of a basic 
need, including food, shelter or clothing.
277
  To be sure, a particular 
farmer’s GM crop could be used in the production of an unnecessary item.  
For example, cotton grown from GM seed could be used to make a 
Halloween costume.  Halloween costumes are not a basic need, but under 
this test, judges would look at whether the crop, as a class, is commonly 
used in supplying a basic need.  Because cotton is commonly used to 
manufacture shirts, pants, and socks, the production of cotton from GM 
seed would always satisfy the basic need element.  Likewise, the most 
common GM crops, wheat, corn, and soybeans, would certainly fall within 
the basic need category. 
Indeed, just nine of the world’s plants – wheat, rice, maize, barley, 
sorghum/millet, potato, sweet potato/yam, sugarcane, and soybean – 
constitute approximately three-fourths of all plant-derived food consumed 
around the world.
278
  This production is concentrated unevenly throughout 
the world, with India, the United States, the Russian Federation, China, and 
Brazil constituting 42.6 percent of the total cropland in service from 2008 – 
2010 and the bottom 100 countries constituting only 1.05 percent 
combined.
279
  The importance of these crops to feeding not only the U.S., 
but the world, is of the utmost importance. 
                                                          
275
 A similar inquiry is made in trade secret litigation when the defendant misappropriated 
the plaintiff’s information by improper means, but successfully defends by arguing that the 
information was not protected because it would have been readily ascertainable had the 
defendant opted for that route of discovering the information. 
276
 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Rights to Exclude: Property, 
Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 620-21 (2008). 
277
 Daniel Benoliel, Copyright Distributive Injustice, 10 YALE J. L. & TECH. 45, 67 (Fall 
2007-2008) (citing Shubha Ghosh, The Fable of the Commons: Exclusivity and the 
Construction of Intellectual Property Markets, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855 (2007)). 
278
 FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 233, at 17.  
279
 Philip G. Pardey, Julian M. Alston & Connie Chan Kang, Agricultural Production, 
Productivity And R&D Over The Past Half Century: An Emerging New World Order 
(Aug. 24, 2012), at 4 (unpublished paper presented at International Association of 
Agricultural Economists), available at 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/131824/2/PardeyEtAlFinal.pdf. 
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The basic need element is important not only because of the 
importance of food, clothing, and shelter to survival, but also because it 
limits the applicability of this defense.  As noted above, courts loathe 
compelling patent licenses and the de facto SEP defense should be narrowly 
construed so as to not upset this tradition. 
 
C.  Effects of De Facto SEP Status 
1.  De Facto SEP Leads to an Implied License 
An implied contract is one that “is inferred from conduct other than 
the speaking or writing of words.”280  The proper measure of damages for 
breach of an implied contract is quantum meruit, the reasonable value of the 
services or materials provided.
281
  Where a court finds that a patent has 
reached de facto SEP status, it is then possible for the court to find that the 
patent must be impliedly licensed to the infringing farmer.  Judge Posner’s 
decision in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. lends some support for this.
282
  In 
this case, Motorola obtained SEP status for one of its patents from the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).
283
  IEEE is an SSO 
responsible for adopting standards for the electronics industry.
284
  
Motorola’s patent was essential to the (IEEE) 802.11 wireless local area 
network standard.
 285
  As part of IEEE’s policies, it required SEPs to be 
licensed to applicants on RAND terms.
286
  Apple used the Motorola patent 
and Motorola filed suit for patent infringement.
287
 
In addressing whether injunctive relief for Motorola would be 
appropriate, Judge Posner, determined that injunctive relief was improper 
given Motorola’s commitment to license its SEP on RAND terms.288  
Importantly, Judge Posner seemed to suggest that there was not yet an 
express contract between Motorola and Apple to license the patent on 
RAND terms, but rather the parties were engaged in preliminary 
                                                          
280
 JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 40 (LexisNexis 5th ed. 2011). 
281
 Clayson v. Zebe, 280 P.3d 731, 738 (Idaho 2012). 
282
 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
283
 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 995 (W.D. Wash. 2012). 
284
 Id.  
285
 Id.  
286
 Id. at 996.  
287
 Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d 901. 
288
 Id. at 913-14 (“I don’t see how, given FRAND, I would be justified in enjoining Apple 
from infringing the ‘898 unless Apple refuses to pay a royalty that meets the FRAND 
requirement.”). 
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negotiations to do so.
 289
  As a result, Motorola’s obligation to license on 
RAND terms could very well be the result of an implied license.
290
  Other 
scholars have suggested the same approach should be applied in similar 
circumstances.
291
 
Of course, Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. involved a de jure SEP.  
However, the same principles apply in the case of a de facto SEP.  Where 
patented technology reaches de facto SEP status and the patentee does not 
voluntarily make such technology available through an SSO on RAND 
terms, there is a basis for finding an implied license between the patentee 
and those who cannot produce a product without infringing the patent.  In 
New York v. Microsoft, the district court found that Microsoft’s application 
programming interfaces, communication protocols and related technology 
(collectively, Microsoft’s IP) had become essential for any software 
developer that wanted its program to run on a computer using a Microsoft 
operating system, that is, most computers.
292
  Phrased differently, because 
of Microsoft’s dominance in the industry, Microsoft’s IP had become de 
facto standards.
293
  The court implied a license between Microsoft and the 
software developers on RAND terms.
294
   
Of course, New York v. Microsoft was an antitrust action,
295
 not a 
case where Microsoft was suing the software developers for patent 
infringement like we see in Ralph.
296
  However, upon closer examination 
we see that the underlying dynamics are the same.  The software developers 
could not produce their product – e.g., software – without infringing 
Microsoft’s IP rights.  Farmers cannot produce their product – e.g., 
soybeans – without infringing Monsanto’s patent.  In the first case, the court 
                                                          
289
 Id. at 914 (“But Apple’s refusal to negotiate for a license (if it did refuse – the parties 
offer competing accounts, unnecessary for me to resolve, of why negotiations broke down) 
was not a defense to a claim by Motorola for a FRAND royalty.”).  This language indicates 
that, at best, Motorola were engaged in preliminary negotiations rather than having formed 
a contract. 
290
 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 2012 WL 5416941, *14 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 29, 
2012) (“[I]t also could be that he believed . . . that Motorola’s commitments created an 
implied license that rendered moot any claim to injunctive relief.”). 
291
 Lemley, supra note 206, at 1925; Lichtman, supra note 139, at 1043 (“Courts could just 
as well interpret RAND as creating an implied license, with the license rendering moot any 
claim to injunctive relief or triple damages, but leaving the court with the power to 
determine the royalty due.”). 
292
 New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 89 n.11 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d, in 
relevant part, 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
293
 Id. 
294
 Id. at 177-78. 
295
 Id.  
296
 Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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implied a license to level the playing field;
297
 in the second case, the court 
should imply a license to level the playing field.
298
   
In Europe, required licensing of de facto SEPs is more established.  
For example, the European Commission indicates that when a protected 
technology becomes a de facto industry standard, “[t]he main concern will 
then be to ensure that these standards are as open as possible and applied in 
a clear non-discriminatory manner.  To avoid elimination of competition in 
the relevant market(s), access to the standard must be possible for third 
parties on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.”299   
Not only might refusing to license a de facto SEP on RAND terms 
constitute an abuse of a dominant position, but European authorities, like 
those in the United States, have ordered licensing on RAND terms as a 
remedy for such abuses.
300
  For example, in NDC Health v. IMS Health, 
IMS Health held a copyright in a “brick structure” used for collecting data 
about pharmaceutical sales, which was, in turn, useful to pharmaceutical 
companies.
301
  IMS Health refused to license its brick structure to two 
competitors and obtained injunctions against them.
302
  One of the 
                                                          
297
 Samuelson, supra note 225, at 1997-98; see also William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, 
Software Development as an Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the Enforcement of the 
Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 77, 83 (2007) (“Other provisions of the final judgments that the court 
characterized as ‘forward-looking’ are even more tenuously linked to proven monopolistic 
conduct.  Of these, the ‘most forward-looking’ and most problematic in terms of the 
principles of antitrust relief is the requirement that Microsoft “make available” its 
proprietary communications protocols that permit Windows servers to interoperate with 
Windows client computers.  These technologies had almost nothing to do with the 
government’s case, and there was no holding that Microsoft had manipulated them for 
exclusionary purposes.”). 
298
 Samuelson, supra note 225, at 1983-84 (“Some commentators and policymakers have 
called for a liability rule approach to patents on interfaces.  This would allow unlicensed 
persons to implement patented interfaces to achieve interoperability as long as these 
persons offered reasonable compensation to the patentee.  A liability rule approach can be 
implemented in a number of ways.”).  See also id. at 1986 (“[Another] approach to 
interface patents was proposed during the debate over the proposed European directive on 
the patentability of computer-implemented innovations.  The Foundation for Free 
Information Infrastructure (FFII) urged the European Parliament to adopt its proposal to 
require owners of patents on interfaces indispensable to achieving interoperability to 
license such patents on reasonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND) terms.”). 
299
 Commission Notice, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to 
horizontal cooperation agreements, 2001 OJ (C 3), 2, 25 (discussing standards formed by a 
group of firms). 
300
 Commission Decision 2001/165 EC, 2002 OJ (L 59) 18, 46-48. 
301
 Id. at 20-22.  
302
 Robert Pitofsky et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under United States Antitrust 
Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 444 (2002). 
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competitors, NDC, made a complaint to the European Commission claiming 
that IMS Health’s refusal to license the brick structure was an abuse of a 
dominant position.
303
  After considering the evidence, the European 
Commission ordered IMS Health to grant access to the copyrighted brick 
structure on RAND terms.
304
  As one commentator noted, “[a]fter a careful 
economic analysis of the German market, the Commission concluded that 
IMS’ brick structure amounted to a de facto standard essential for operating 
in that relevant market.  The conclusion was based on the fact that 
consumers (i.e., pharmaceutical firms) were essentially locked in to IMS’ 
product and would not switch to any other supplier.”305  
 
2.  A Return to Reasonable Royalties 
As discussed in Part I.B, farmers who grow, replant, or sell GM seed 
find themselves subject to suit by Monsanto and face traditional patent 
infringement remedies based in tort.
306
  Tort remedies are intended to “undo 
the harm”307 or “make the plaintiff whole,” but they are also intended to 
deter and punish.
308
  The result is inflated damages.
309
  As described earlier, 
one way courts justify inflating damages in the GM seed context is by 
finding that Monsanto may choose to “totally exclude others” – that is to 
say, refuse to negotiate.
310
  This imbues disproportionate bargaining power 
on Monsanto, changing the hypothetical negotiation from one involving an 
arms-length negotiation between a willing buyer and willing seller, to a 
non-arms-length negotiation between a willing buyer and a recalcitrant 
seller.  The result is that any upward limit on damages is removed, allowing 
                                                          
303
 Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. v. NDC Health GmbH & Co., 2004 E.C.R. I-
5069, 5074 
304
 Commission Decision 2001/165 EC, 2002 OJ (L 59) 18, 46-48; Robert Pitofsky et al., 
supra note 302, at 444. 
305
 Emanuela Arezzo, Intellectual Property Rights at the Crossroad Between 
Monopolization and Abuse of Dominant Position: American and European Approaches 
Compared, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 455, 489 (2006) (emphasis added). 
306
 See supra Parts I.B. and II. 
307
 Harry G. Prince, Overprotecting the Consumer? Section 2-607(3)(A) Notice Of Breach 
In Nonprivity Contexts, 66 N.C. L. REV. 107 (1987). 
308
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1965). 
309
 See supra Part II.B. 
310
 Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The hypothetical 
negotiation is often referred to as a ‘willing licensor/willing licensee’ negotiation.  
However, this is an inaccurate, and even absurd, characterization when, as here, the 
patentee does not wish to grant a license.”). 
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the court to ignore the fact that “no sane farmer would ever negotiate a 
royalty in excess of his anticipated profits.”311 
Establishing the patent as a de facto SEP may ameliorate the danger 
of inflated damages;
312
 by declaring that Monsanto’s genetic modifications 
are de facto SEPs, the court can institute an implied license between 
Monsanto and the farmer.  As such, the remedies model changes from one 
based in tort to one based in contract.  Contract remedies are intended to put 
the plaintiff in the position it would have been in had the contract been 
performed, otherwise known as “benefit of the bargain damages” or 
“expectation damages.”313   
Because there is no difference between an express license (called a 
technology agreement in the case of GM seed) and an implied license,
314
 the 
benefit of the bargain to Monsanto is the “technology fee” it charges to 
other farmers when they purchase GM seed.
315
  All that is required is that 
the technology fee be calculated for the number of acres in question.  Take 
the example of soybean seed; the price per bag included a technology fee of 
$5.
316
  First, the court multiplies the “acreage by the planting density to 
obtain the total weight of soybean seed planted.”317  The court then divides 
the total weight by 50 to calculate the number of bags used (i.e., a 50 pound 
                                                          
311
 Id. 
312
 Id. 
313
 “The license render[s] moot any claim to injunctive relief or triple damages, . . . leaving 
the court with the power to determine the royalty due.”  Lichtman, supra note 139, at 1043; 
see Lemley, supra note 206, at 1925 (“The IP owner in that case has only a contractual 
claim for a royalty, not a not a cause of action for patent infringement that might result in 
treble damages or an injunction.”). 
314
 “To the extent that the Declared-Essential Patents are essential to any ETSI standard and 
to the extent any of the alleged inventions described in and allegedly covered by the 
Declared-Essential Patents are used, manufactured, or sold by or for Apple, its suppliers, 
and/or its customers, Apple is licensed to the Declared-Essential Patents pursuant to 
Samsung’s commitments to license its Declared-Essential Patents on FRAND terms; or, in 
the alternative, Apple has the irrevocable right to be licensed on FRAND terms under those 
patents.  In addition, to the extent that Apple is licensed, expressly, impliedly, or by 
operation of law, by virtue of any agreement between Samsung and an Apple supplier, 
Apple is licensed.” Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corporation, 849 F. Supp. 2d 925, 944-45 
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 11-1846 LHK, 
Docket No. 124, at 25); see McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (explaining that express and implied contracts are subject to the same principles of 
contract law). 
315
 Recall that when following a remedy model based in tort, courts reject the technology 
fee, because simply awarding the technology fee would not result in adequate deterrence.  
However, that objection disappears when the remedy model is based in contract.   
316
 Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
317
 Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009, 1018 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
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bag equals one unit).
318
  The number of bags is then multiplied by $5.  
Returning to the case of Monsanto Co. v. Ralph discussed above, Ralph 
would pay a royalty for each bag of GM seed he harvested and replanted: 
(696+438) * $5/bag = $6,170.
319
  Not $199,918.
320
   
In the SEP context, courts are much more willing to base their 
damage calculations with an established royalty.
321
  In Microsoft Corp. v. 
Motorola, Inc., the court refused to exclude the testimony of an expert 
witness who planned to testify that RAND terms could be based on an 
initial 2.25% established royalty rate.
322
  This initial royalty rate was based 
on prior license agreements involving some or all of the standard essential 
patents.
323
  The case for using an established royalty in Monsanto’s GM 
seed litigation is even easier because the established rate is for the exact 
same product. 
 The law should not ignore the fact that even if Monsanto has not 
sought de jure SEP status, it has achieved de facto SEP status.   Failing to 
recognize de facto SEP status for its patents allows Monsanto to avoid the 
restrictions faced by holders of de jure SEPs.  It is well understood that SEP 
status means a patent holder will receive less royalty per use.
324
  Firms 
accept this trade-off, considering “additional sales volume they are likely to 
achieve by having their technology incorporated into a standard.”325  
Indeed, by avoiding SEP status for what is a de facto SEP, Monsanto is able 
to have its cake and eat it too.  It has high sales that accompany an SEP 
without the trade-off of a lower royalty. 
 
                                                          
318
 Id. at 1019.  
319
 Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1379.  
320
 Id. (limited to soybeans, but trebled for willful infringement). 
321
 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2012 WL 5248439, *5-6 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 22, 
2012).  
322
 Id. 
323
 Id.  The court has not yet decided what the damages are for the breach of contract.  
However, the fact that the court is entertaining the possibility of using prior license 
agreements as a basis is more encouraging than the GM seed courts, which regularly refuse 
prior license agreements as a measure of damages for patent infringement.  See supra Part 
II.A. 
324
 Conferring SEP status on a patent actually can confer more market power.  As such, the 
owners of SEP are generally limited to charging a license fee that is reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory (RAND).  Thus, as Judge Posner stated in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 
“[t]he proper method of computing a [RAND] royalty starts with what the cost to the 
licensee would have been of obtaining, just before the patented invention was declared 
essential to compliance with the industry standard, a license for the function performed by 
the patent.”  Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012).  
325
 George S. Cary et al., The Case for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup Problem 
in Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 913 (2011). 
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3.  Inapplicability of Injunctions 
Finally, following a contract model of remedies will negate the 
possibility of an injunction.   “The traditional goal of the law of contract 
remedies has not been compulsion of the promisor to perform his promise 
but compensation of the promisee for the loss resulting from breach.”326   
Indeed, courts and commentators are in general agreement that a court 
cannot impose an injunction where a patent is an SEP.
327
  Judge Posner 
stated in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. that he would not “be justified in 
enjoining Apple from infringing [the patent at issue] unless Apple refuses to 
pay a royalty that meets the [RAND] requirement.
  
 By committing to 
license its patents on [RAND] terms, Motorola committed to license the 
[patent] to anyone willing to pay a [RAND] royalty and thus implicitly 
acknowledged that a royalty is adequate compensation for a license to use 
that patent.”328 
Instead of granting injunctive relief for future infringement, the 
courts should award ongoing royalties.  The Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit recognized the ability to grant ongoing royalties in Paice 
LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.
329
  As Professor Mark Lemley argues, the 
ongoing royalty rate should be the reasonable royalty.
330
  For GM seed 
infringement cases, once the court uses the established royalty (as opposed 
to inflated hypothetical negotiations) as the reasonable royalty, the court 
should also use the established royalty as the ongoing royalty rate for future 
infringement. 
 
IV.  OVERCOMING HOSTILITY TO COMPULSORY LICENSING 
Although court-compelled licensing is rare, especially where the 
technology is protected by exclusive rights, it is not entirely new.  As 
discussed in Part III.C above, where technology is granted SEP status by an 
                                                          
326
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Intro. Note to Ch. 16, at 100 (1981); see also 
E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 
1147 (1970) (“Our system, then, is not directed at compulsion of promisors to prevent 
breach; rather, it is aimed at relief to promisees to redress breach.”). 
327
 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2012). 
328
 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
329
 Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1213-14 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
330
 Mark A. Lemley, The Ongoing Confusion Over Ongoing Royalties, 76 MO. L. REV. 695, 
701-02 (2011) (“According to black-letter patent law, a reasonable royalty represents the 
rate a willing buyer and a willing seller would have agreed upon if they had known that the 
patent was valid and infringed.  Conveniently, that determination is precisely what an 
ongoing royalty in lieu of an injunction is supposed to represent: what the parties would be 
willing to agree on now that they know the patent is valid and infringed.”). 
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SSO (a de jure SEP), or even by virtue of firm dominance (a de facto SEP), 
courts may imply a license.  In the former, the court implied a license as to 
Motorola’s proprietary cell phone technology.331  In the latter, the court 
implied a license as to Microsoft’s proprietary computer technology.332 
Federal legislation evidences a willingness on the part of lawmakers 
to compel licenses when necessary to level the playing field between 
corporations and farmers.  The Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA)
333
 was 
enacted in 1970 to deal with certain classes of plants.
334
 It created sui 
generis rights analogous to patent rights in certain sexually reproduced 
plants.
335
  The PVPA gives patent-like protection in the form of a certificate 
to new sexually reproducing plant varieties that are distinct, uniform, and 
stable.
336
  A PVPA certificate holder is given the right to sue for 
infringement, which consists of, inter alia, selling or marketing the variety, 
sexually multiplying the variety as a step in marketing, using the variety in 
producing a hybrid, or dispensing the variety without notice that the variety 
is protected.
337
 
Unlike utility patents, PVPA rights are subject to substantial 
limitations.  The most important for our purposes is the statutory “saved 
seed” exemption.  This exemption “allows farmers who grow protected 
varieties (obtained through authorized sources) to save the resulting seed for 
the production of a subsequent crop ‘for use on the farm.’”338  Importantly 
for our purposes, the PVPA creates a compulsory license scheme in which 
two-year compulsory licenses will be granted by the Agriculture Secretary 
at a reasonable royalty rate when “the Secretary determines that such 
declaration is necessary in order to insure an adequate supply of fiber, food, 
or feed in this country and that the owner is unwilling or unable to supply 
the public needs for the variety at a price which may reasonably be deemed 
fair.”339 
Likewise, more recently introduced legislation, the Seed Availability 
and Competition Act of 2013, would allow those who plant patented seed or 
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 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 995 (W.D. Wash. 2012). 
332
 New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 177-78 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d, in 
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 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (2012). 
334
 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 138 (2001). 
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 Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, U.S. Plant Variety Protections: Sound and Fury . . . ?, 
39 HOUS. L. REV. 727, 731 (2002). 
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 7 U.S.C. § 2402. 
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 J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 139 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a)). 
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 Janis & Kesan, supra note 335, at 751-52; see also 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (permitting farmers 
to engage in “bona fide” sales of saved seed “for other than reproductive purposes.”). 
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 7 U.S.C. § 2404; see also Janis & Kesan, supra note 335, at 752. 
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seed derived from patented seed to retain and replant seed if the farmer 
notifies the Secretary of Agriculture and pays a fee to be established by the 
Secretary.
340
  Under this proposed legislation, these fees would then be 
distributed to patentees.
341
  Because compulsory licensing has previously 
been contemplated and implemented, the idea of compelling a license of 
GM seed through the de facto SEP framework we provide may be more 
digestible to courts and Congress. 
Importantly, our proposal does not require Congressional action or 
new bureaucracy.  Under the proposed framework, consistent with existing 
common law doctrine, a court can imply a license from Monsanto to farmer 
where: (1) the patent holder has achieved dominance in a given field; (2) it 
is impracticable to expect that a farmer could operate without infringing the 
patent; and (3) the farmer is growing a crop used to meet a basic human 
need.
342
  That does not preclude the courts and Congress from acting 
concurrently; courts could use our proposed framework while they wait for 
Congress to pass the Seed Availability and Competition Act of 2013.
343
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Whether Monsanto’s lawsuits against farmers are reasonable is 
debatable.  But when the courts inflate damage calculations and routinely 
grant injunctions in these cases, they remove the dispute from the realm of 
reasonableness and threaten the traditions of an age-old profession and 
those who have practiced them.  Moreover, the overwhelming dominance of 
GM products in the production of food and clothing (human needs) sets 
them apart from other technological innovations.   
As such, courts or Congress should be willing to deviate from their 
reluctance to compulsory licensing and embrace a more balanced system.  
Such a system would allow farmers to continue their traditions and 
professions, but also would permit and encourage companies like Monsanto 
to continue to develop technologies to enhance agricultural production.  
Recognizing a de facto SEP affirmative defense, in which the farmer proves 
(1) dominance in the field; (2) impracticability of operating without 
infringing; and (3) the crop is used to meet a basic human need, would 
result in an implied license to the farmer under RAND terms.  This 
                                                          
340
 Seed Availability and Competition Act of 2013, H.R. 193, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013). 
341
 Id.  Although it sounds promising, Representative Kaptur has introduced similar bills 
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approach forces the courts to reconceptualize the dispute as a traditional 
contract dispute rather than one based in tort, where inflated damages are 
the norm.  As a result, a more appropriate balance between age-old 
traditions and innovation continues. 
